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ABSTRACT
Resource allocation is one of the most challenging issues policy decision makers
must address. The objective of this thesis is to explore the resource allocation from an
economical perspective, i.e., how to purchase resources in order to satisfy customers’
requests. This thesis attends to answer the question: when and how to buy resources
to fulfill customers’ demands with minimum costs?
The first topic studied in this thesis is resource allocation in cloud networks. Cloud
computing heralded an era where resources (such as computation and storage) can
be scaled up and down elastically and on demand. This flexibility is attractive for its
cost effectiveness: the cloud resource price depends on the actual utilization over time.
This thesis studies two critical problems in cloud networks, focusing on the economical
aspects of the resource allocation in the cloud/virtual networks, and proposes six
algorithms to address the resource allocation problems for different discount models.
The first problem attends a scenario where the virtual network provider offers different
contracts to the service provider. Four algorithms for resource contract migration are
proposed under two pricing models: Pay-as-You-Come and Pay-as-You-Go. The
second problem explores a scenario where a cloud provider offers k contracts each
with a duration and a rate respectively and a customer buys these contracts in order
to satisfy its resource demand. This work shows that this problem can be seen as a 2-
dimensional generalization of the classic online parking permit problem, and present
a k-competitive online algorithm and an optimal offline algorithm.
The second topic studied in this thesis is to explore how resource allocation and
purchasing strategies work in our daily life. For example, is it worth buying a Yoga
pass which costs USD 100 for ten entries, although it will expire at the end of this year?
Decisions like these are part of our daily life, yet, not much is known today about good
online strategies to buy discount vouchers with expiration dates. This work hence
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introduces a Discount Voucher Purchase Problem (DVPP). It aims to optimize the
strategies for buying discount vouchers, i.e., coupons, vouchers, groupons which are
valid only during a certain time period. The DVPP comes in three flavors: (1) Once-
Expired-Lose-Everything (OELE): Vouchers lose their entire value after expiration.
(2) Once-Expired-Lose-Discount (OELD): Vouchers lose their discount value after
expiration. (3) Limited Purchasing Window (LPW):Vouchers have the property of
OELE and can only be bought during a certain time window.
This work explores online algorithms with a provable competitive ratio against a
clairvoyant offline algorithm, even in the worst case. In particular, this work makes the
following contributions: this work presents a 4-competitive algorithm for OELE, an 8-
competitive algorithm for OELD, and a lower bound for LPW. This work also presents
an optimal offline algorithm for OELE and LPW, and shows it is a 2-approximation
solution for OELD.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Allocation of network resources is one of the most challenging and critical issues
that network administrators must carefully address. This thesis attends to this issue
by addressing economical aspects of resource allocation , namely we consider in broad
terms the problem of when and how to buy resources to fulfill customers’ demands
with minimum cost.
The first research topic studied in this thesis is resource allocation in cloud net-
works. Nowadays, the Internet is an integrated part of our daily life and information
spread becomes extremely fast. An emerging technology, called network virtualiza-
tion, helps realize the vision of an Internet where resources offered by different stake-
holders are used and shared by multiple co-existing virtual networks. The abstraction
introduced by network virtualization opens many new business opportunities. It is
expected that in the near future, infrastructure providers, resource brokers, and re-
source resellers will offer flexibly specifiable and on-demand virtual networks over
the Internet, similarly to the traditional elastic resources provided by today’s clouds.
This motivates us to explore virtual network resource allocation problems in clouds
from an economical perspective.
Resources in clouds (e.g., CPUs and storages) are provided as general utilities that
can be leased and released by users in an on-demand fashion through the Internet.
Network virtualization not only introduces an Internet-wide resource market, but also
initiates many new business models. One example is that a startup company running
web services no longer needs to invest in its own infrastructure, but can dynamically
lease cloud resources to provide the services to its customers in a dynamic and cost-
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efficient manner. For instance, online content provider Netflix is able to support
seamless global service by partnering with Amazon Web Services (AWS) for services
and delivery of content. AWS enables Netflix to quickly deploy thousands of servers
and terabytes of storage within minutes. Users can stream Netflix shows and movies
from anywhere in the world, including on the web, on tablets, or on mobile devices
such as iPhones. Another example is that of a hybrid resource provision framework.
Specifically, virtualized cloud resources can be used to help an infrastructure provider
deal with a large amount of loads during peak periods when this provider does not
have enough capacity in its infrastructure. Resource brokerage is another emerging
business model. A broker may lease a large amount of network resources from different
providers and resell them to its customers (at a higher price).
Most of the previous works for resource allocation focus on migration or resource
embedding in the networks. In this thesis, we attend to the economical aspects of the
resource allocation, i.e., cost reduction. In the perspective of the service providers,
they are faced with the challenge that while moving the server closer to the customers
improves QoS, frequent migrations come at service interruption and bulk data transfer
costs. We aim to minimize the total cost by balancing the tradeoff among all types
of the costs. In the perspective of the service customers, they are faced with the
challenge that its resource demand is not known in advance. In order to satisfy its
demand at any time, and to avoid over-purchasing of the service, resource contracts
need to be bought in advance. The goal is an online purchasing policy in which the
gap between the costs of the bought contracts and the costs of the actual needed
contracts is small.
Therefore, this thesis studies two critical problems in cloud networks, focusing on
the economical aspects of the resource allocation in the cloud/virtual networks The
first problem attends a scenario where the virtual network provider offers different
2
contracts to the service provider. Four algorithms for resource contract migration
are proposed under two pricing models: Pay-as-You-Come and Pay-as-You-Go. The
second problem explores a scenario where a cloud provider offers k contracts each
with a duration and a rate respectively and a customer buys these contracts in order
to satisfy its resource demand. We show that this problem can be seen as a 2-
dimensional generalization of the classic online parking permit problem, and present
a k-competitive online algorithm and an optimal offline algorithm.
The second research topic studied in this thesis is to explore how resource alloca-
tion/purchasing strategies work in our daily life. As the Internet becomes widespread
and the information spreads quickly, the competition among different companies be-
comes more and more drastic. In order to attract more customers in such a high-
ly competitive market, some companies or even brokers offer discount vouchers to
improve the profits. For example, a company called Groupon, offers one Groupon
voucher per day in each of the markets it serves where each Groupon may have one
or more discount rates.
Naturally, from customers’ perspective, they aim to minimize the overall money
spent and only buy the vouchers or passes if these are really needed. Let us consider
an example scenario, where Alice regularly takes yoga classes, and wants to decide
whether she shall buy a yoga pass for the next year (the pass will expire at the end of
the year). The yoga pass costs USD C, and allows Alice to join C
pi(p)
yoga classes each
at a discounted price pi(p) instead of the original price p per class. Unfortunately,
however, Alice is not sure on how long she will be interested in yoga, and in the worst
case, she may not attend any classes in the future after having bought the pass. This
thesis studies online strategies that help Alice to decide whether it is worth buying
the pass. More specifically, we are interested in online purchasing strategies which
ensure that the money spent by Alice is not far from the money spent by an optimal
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and clairvoyant offline algorithm which knows whether Alice will be interested in yoga
in the future.
We hence introduce a discount purchase problem, called the Discount Voucher
Purchase Problem (DVPP). It aims to optimize the strategies for buying discount
vouchers, i.e., coupons, vouchers, groupons which are valid only during a certain time
period. The DVPP comes in three policies:
Once expire lose everything (OELE): The voucher loses its entire value after its
expiration date.
Once expire lose discount (OELD): The voucher loses its discount for the un-
used face value after its expiration date.
Limited purchasing window (LPW): The voucher not only has the same prop-
erty as that of OELD, but also has a limited purchasing window allowed for
purchasing by customers.
We present an online algorithm that can compute a 4-competitive solution to OELE
and an 8-competitive solution to OELD. We also prove a lower bound on online
competitive ratio for LPW. In addition, we present an offline algorithm that can
compute an optimal solution to OELE and LPW and a 2-competitive solution to
OELD.
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 1 we define the research problems
studied in this thesis. In Chapter 2, we study two pricing strategies Pay-as-You-Come
and Pay-as-You-Go for the optimal service migration in virtual networks, and then
discuss an online algorithm. In Chapter 3, we study an online cloud resource allocation
problem and analyze both upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratios. An
optimal offline algorithm is proposed as a blackbox for this online algorithm. In
Chapter 4, we study the Discount Voucher Purchase Problem (DVPP) and discuss
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three variants of DVPP. We show competitive online algorithms for OELE and
OELD and discuss the lower bound for LPW. We present an offline algorithm for
OELE and LPW, and show it is 2-approximation to OELD. In Chapter 5 we conclude
the completed work and discuss lines for future work.
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Chapter 2
OPTIMAL MIGRATION CONTRACTS IN VIRTUAL NETWORKS:
PAY-AS-YOU-COME VS PAY-AS-YOU-GO PRICING
2.1 Introduction
The Internet becomes more and more virtualized and programmable (or “software-
defined”), and we witness a trend towards extending the cloud paradigm to the net-
work. Researchers in the field of network virtualization develop prototype architec-
tures that herald flexibly specifiable, fully virtual networks (VNets) (also known as
CloudNets): virtual networks that can be requested at short notice (and even be
migrated arbitrarily within the specification constraints), while providing isolation
guarantees (e.g., in terms of QoS or security). This paradigm has the potential to
open a network infrastructure for a wide range of new and innovative services, and
it is believed that new economical entities will emerge that lease (or re-lease) infras-
tructure parts to service providers.
We expect that in the near future, such virtual networks connecting arbitrary
locations (and spanning multiple autonomous systems and providers) in the Internet
can be leased similarly to the resource leasing models of today’s clouds. The work in
this chapter attends to a use case for such dynamic VNets where a service provider
offers a flexible and latency-critical service (for instance a web service, an SAP server
or a game server) to its mobile customers whose demand and locations changes over
time (e.g., due to time-zone effects or commuting). We assume that the service
provider itself uses the resource services of a substrate infrastructure provider (e.g., a
physical infrastructure provider or a virtual network provider) in order to offer a low-
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latency access to a server which can be migrated seamlessly in the VNet (i.e., without
reconfiguration or changes of routable network addresses). The service provider is
faced with the challenge that while moving the server closer to the customers improves
QoS (and/or reduces roaming costs), frequent migrations come at service interruption
and bulk data transfer costs. We initiate the study of optimal offline and online
migration strategies for the service provider under two different pricing models.
Our Contribution. This work initiates the study of the virtual server migration
problem from an economical perspective. We compare the two most basic pricing
policies Pay-as-You-Come and Pay-as-You-Go (see, e.g., [34]), in which a service
provider has to pay in advance for time-based contracts respectively in retrospect for
the resources actually used. The service provider receives a discount when buying
larger contracts, e.g., a contract of twice the resource volume only costs 50% more.
As a first step, we design offline migration algorithms for different settings and dis-
count functions. We find that optimal offline solutions can indeed be computed in
polynomial time by using non-trivial dynamic programs. This work also initiates
exploring online migration strategies.
Work Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss
related work in section 2.2. In section 2.3, we discuss the model used in this work.
We present two offline migration strategies in section 2.4. As a first look, we have
a short discussion on online algorithm for both pricing strategies in section 2.6. We
conclude this problem in section 2.7.
2.2 Related Work
Our work is motivated by the advent of first network virtualization prototype
architectures such as GENI. For a good overview of the network virtualization field,
see [14]. Theoretical research on network virtualization often focuses on the problem
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of how to embed VNets, e.g., [13, 48, 37] (and especially the survey [8]), while bene-
fitting from specification flexibilities [29]. Naturally, there are also many papers and
results on migration (e.g., [2, 5, 23, 45]): the possibility to migrate is one of the key
advantages of the virtualization abstraction; it is due to the decoupling of services
from the physical infrastructure. Indeed, it has been shown that it can make sense
to migrate a Samba front-end server closer to the clients even for bulk-data applica-
tions [24]. Our work builds upon the formal migration model studied in [5] and ports
it to an economical setting.
Economical aspects of network virtualization are much less well-understood, but
there exist strong ties with related problems in, e.g., cloud computing. For example,
Armbrust et al. [30] made an effort to understand cloud computing economical models
for long-term hosting a service in the cloud. Dash et al. [17] proposed an economic
model for self-tuned cloud caching targeting the service of scientific data. Recently,
Pal and Hui [34] devised and analyzed three inter-organizational economic models
relevant to cloud networks, and formulated non-cooperative price and QoS games
between multiple cloud providers existing in a cloud market. In the context of network
virtualization, Schaffrath et al. [38] identified stakeholders and economical roles in
a network virtualization environment. The authors distinguish between a physical
infrastructure provider, a virtual network provider (i.e., resource reseller), a virtual
network operator and a service provider. In terms of pricing, Even et al. [18] presented
an online algorithm which decides which VNets to accept and embed such that the
overall provider benefit is maximized. The benefit threshold of when to accept a VNet
can be seen as a simple form of pricing. Migration is not considered in [18].
Finally, a description of our own network virtualization prototype (currently using
VLANs) which is developed at Telekom Innovation Laboratories and NTT DoCoMo
Eurolabs and which motivates our work can be found in [38]. Currently, migration
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is seamless (i.e., without the need for reconfigurations) but not live. See [16] for a
migration demo.
2.3 Model
A virtual network topology can be modeled as a graph G = (V,E) where V (G)
denotes the set of nodes and E(G) the set of links. We assume that a service provider
can place its service (i.e., the server) on any location in the virtual network. Requests
can originate from different access points in V (G), and the access cost is given by the
shortest path (depending on some given metric D) to the server location in V (G). In
order to reduce the access cost, the virtual server can be migrated along the links in
E(G). To do so, the service provider needs to purchase bandwidth along the migration
path.
We attend to a scenario where a virtual network provider offers the service provider
a choice of contracts of different durations in which dedicated resources can be leased
in the virtual network (e.g., for migration), i.e., D = {d1, d2, . . . , dk} (we assume
d1< d2<. . .< dk). In addition to the contract durations, the service provider can
choose between different bandwidths along the links, i.e., it can choose among the
following set of bandwidths for each link: B = {b1, b2, . . . , bq} (we also assume that
b1<b2 <. . .<bq).
We consider two different pricing models. Under Pay-as-You-Go pricing, a cus-
tomer only needs to pay for the used resources after the actual consumption (or at
regular time intervals T ), and the best contract is determined according to the usage
pattern a posteriori. Pay-as-You-Go pricing is often used in the context of cloud
resource leasing. In contrast, in the Pay-as-You-Come model, a customer needs to
decide in advance which kind of time-based contracts she is interested in, and needs
to buy them before the actual resource usage. Examples for this model can be found,
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e.g., in the context of private Internet access where users often pay in advance and
independently of the actual usage pattern.
In this work, in order to focus on the main tradeoffs, we initiate the study of
these pricing models in a simplified scenario where the virtual network consists of two
locations only (e.g., one in the U.S. and one in Asia); we will refer to these locations by
L (left) and R (right) respectively and normalize their distance to one unit. The server
can be migrated arbitrarily between the two locations if a corresponding resource
contract is present for the bulk-data transfers. Concretely, a contract in the Pay-
as-You-Come model consists of a duration di and the bandwidth bj to lease the
virtual link between the two sites for di units (e.g., days) and at a bandwidth of bj
(e.g., Mbit/s). The price of the contract is given by a function f(di, bj), where f(·, ·)
describes a monotonic increasing discount over the contract duration and over the
amount of reserved resources. For example, a twice as long contract may cost only
50% more, and doubling the reserved bandwidth may cost only 30% more. In the
Pay-as-You-Go model, the customer only needs to pay when the service is finished
or after a given duration, i.e., every T time units (e.g., a month), and only for the
resources (and bulk data transfers) that are actually used. Concretely, if µi migrations
are performed during the time period T at a bandwidth of bj ∈ B, the overall costs
amount to f(µi, bj).
The main objective is to minimize the migration and contracting costs (denoted
by MigCost and ConCost) while providing QoS guarantees (minimize access cost
AccCost). Hence, we seek to minimize the following cost function:
Cost = AccCost + MigCost + ConCost
We assume there are n requests total, denoted by a set < r1, r2, · · · , rn > at
respective times < t1, t2, · · · , tn >. The access cost is given by the latency of the re-
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quests ri ∈ V (G) to the location of the server si ∈ V (G), i.e., AccCost =
∑
iD[ri, si]
where ri and si denote the ith request node and the server location at time ti. The
migration cost MigCost is given by the service interruption time (see also [10]),
i.e., the time to transfer the server which is determined by the bandwidth of the
weakest link along the migration path. (In a system supporting live migration, this
cost can be negligible and set to zero.) Concretely, the migration cost is comput-
ed as MigCost =
∑
i S · D[si−1, si]/bi, where S is the server size, D[si−1, si] denotes
whether the locations si−1 ∈ {L,R} and si ∈ {L,R} differ (recall that D[si−1, si]
is 1 if si−1 6= si, and 0 otherwise), and bi ∈ B is the (minimal) bandwidth along
the migration path. Finally, the contract cost is computed as described above, i.e.,
ConCost =
∑
i f(di, bi) for the Pay-as-You-Come model and as ConCost = f(µ, bi) for
Pay-as-You-Go model, where di ∈ D, bi ∈ B and µ is the total number of migrations.
The following table summarizes the formalism used in this chapter.
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Terminology
AccCost Access cost
MigCost Migration cost
ConCost Contract cost
n Number of requests
ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Origin of ith request
ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Time of ith request
L,R Left node and right node
D Set of k contract durations
B Set of q different bandwidths
f Discount function
S, sinit Server size and initial server position
s, s′ Server location at the beginning and the end of a time step
Cn×n×4, (Cm)n×n×4 Total cost matrices in PAYC, and PAYG (for each band-
width bm)
(AMm)n×n×4 Combined access cost and migration cost matrix for band-
width bm
(Am)n×n×4 Access cost matrix for bandwidth bm
(Nm)n×n×4 Number of migrations matrix for bandwidth bm
2.4 Service Migration Strategies
This section presents optimal algorithms to compute the best set of contracts
and optimal migration strategies for the two presented pricing models. We will first
present an algorithm PAYC for the Pay-as-You-Come model and prove its optimality,
and then extend this algorithm to a PAYG algorithm which solves the Pay-as-You-Go
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model. Both our algorithms PAYC and PAYG are based on dynamic programming,
and fill out matrices such that optimal substructures are reused.
2.4.1 Pay-as-You-Come
Let us now turn our attention to the first, time-based pricing model. Our PAYC
algorithm stores intermediate minimum total cost results (access, migration and con-
tract costs) in a 3-dimensional matrix Cn×n×4 where n is the total number of requests.
C[i, j, k] denotes an entry of the matrix, where i, j ∈ [1, n] and k ∈ {(s, s′)|s, s′ ∈
{L,R}}. C[i, j, (s, s′)] denotes the minimum total cost for satisfying all requests from
ri to rj for a scenario where at the beginning of the ith request the server is at n-
ode s and at the end of request j the server is at node s′. We also need a matrix
(AMm)n×n×4 for each bandwidth bm ∈ B. For a fixed bandwidth bm during the entire
interval [ti, tj], entry AMm[i, j(s, s
′)] stores the combined access and migration costs
for the best migration strategy that satisfies the sequence of requests from ri to rj,
assuming that the server is located at node s at the start of request ri and at node s
′
at the end of request rj. The contract costs, given by the function f , are not included
in the entries of AMm.
Given these data structures, we can describe algorithm PAYC (Algorithm 1) for
the Pay-as-You-Come model. PAYC exploits that the optimal contract from request
time ti to request time tj can either be decomposed into two consecutive subperiods
with no overlapping contracts, or be obtained by buying a contract of long duration
dv and bandwidth bm if dv−1 < tj − ti + 1 ≤ dv, where dv, dv−1 ∈ D.
PAYC starts by initializing the optimal costs if we were to serve only one request
ri, for all possible combinations of starting server location s and ending server location
s′ at time ti. According to our model, the access cost is equal to the distance between
the current requesting node ri and the server location s
′ at the end of time ti, denoted
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm PAYC
Input: Requests <r1, r2, ..., rn> at respective times <t1, t2, ..., tn>.
Output: Minimum cost.
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: for all pairs (s, s′) ∈ {L,R}2 do
3: for m = 1 to q do
4: AMm[i, i, (s, s
′)]← D[s′, ri] + S ·D[s, s′]/bm
5: C[i, i, (s, s′)]← min1≤m≤q{AMm[i, i, (s, s′)] + f(d1 ∗D[s, s′], bm)}
6: for l = 2 to n do
7: for i = 1 to n− l + 1 and pairs (s, s′) ∈ {L,R}2 do
8: j ← i+ l − 1
9: C[i, j, (s, s′)]← mini≤u<j;s′′∈{L,R}{C[i, u, (s, s′′)] + C[u+ 1, j, (s′′, s′)]}
10: if dv−1 < tj − ti + 1 ≤ dv, for some v = {1, · · · , k} then
11: for m = 1 to q do
12: AMm[i, j, (s, s
′)] ← mins′′∈{L,R}{AMm[i, i, (s, s′′)] + AMm[i + 1, j,
(s′′, s′)]}
13: if C[i, j, (s, s′)] > min1≤m≤q{AMm[i, j, (s, s′)] + f(dv, bm)} then
14: C[i, j, (s, s′)]← min1≤m≤q{AMm[i, j, (s, s′)] + f(dv, bm)}
15: return minsfinal∈{L,R}C[1, n, (sinit, sfinal)]
by D[ri, s
′]. If the request at time ti comes from the server location s′, then no access
cost is needed since D[ri, s
′] is 0; otherwise the access cost is positive. Recall that
the migration cost for request ri is computed as S · D[s, s′]/bm, where bm ∈ B is
the selected bandwidth and S is the migrated server size. We store the respective
optimal cost of satisfying request ri (which may or may not incur a non-zero access
cost D[ri, s
′], depending on whether ri 6= s′ or not) using bandwidth bm, with starting
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and ending positions of the server s and s′ respectively, in AMm[i, i, (s, s′)]. We choose
a bandwidth bm ∈ B such that the total cost, including the contract cost f(d1, bm) if
a migration accurs, is minimized, and store the optimal total cost in C[i, i, (s, s′)].
Next, we consider the total costs for sequences of more than one request. Note
that there are l requests occurring between time ti and tj, where i < j are defined in
Lines 7 and 8 of the algorithm and l (= j−i+1) > 1. We have two alternative options:
(i) we can split the interval [ti, tj] at the time tu of request ru, where i ≤ u < j, and
buy contracts for the intervals [ti, tu] and [tu+1, tj] independently for the two possible
locations s′′ of the server at time tu; or (ii) we can buy a long contract of duration
dv ∈ D and some bandwidth bm ∈ B to cover all the l requests if the period tj− ti+1
is between dv−1 and dv. The smaller cost of these two cases gives the optimal cost for
the interval [ti, tj].
We also update AMm[i, j, (s, s
′)], for all possible bandwidths bm. Basically we ex-
tend the intervals already considered by one request (ri), and we store inAMm[i, j, (s, s
′)]
the migration strategy that minimizes the total access and migration costs for satisfy-
ing requests ri through rj using bandwidth bm for starting and ending positions of the
server s and s′ respectively. Note that by taking into account all possible positions
of the server at the end of request ri, we consider all the possibilities of adding ri
to all the best possible strategies already computed for the subsequence ri+1, . . . , rj
(ending at node s′).
We process the previous steps in increasing order of l until l spans all the requests.
Thus, the optimal cost is given by minsfinal∈{L,R}C[1, n, (sinit, sfinal)], where sinit is the
initial server location.
Theorem 1. PAYC (see Algorithm 1) computes the optimal contracts for Pay-as-
You-Come model. The time complexity of PAYC is O(n2(n+ kq)), where n is the
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number of requests, k is the number of contract durations and q is the number of
different bandwidth contracts.
Proof. The correctness follows by induction over the number of request l and by the
optimal substructure property. Due to space constraints, we only sketch the proof.
The claim is trivially true for sequences of one request (Lines 1–5). Consider the time
interval from ti to tj with l requests, where 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n and 2 ≤ l(= j− i+ 1) ≤ n.
This interval is split into two subintervals (Case I), or a long contract is bought that
covers the entire interval (Case II). In Case I, we split the cost at time tu with the
server located at s′′ such that the total cost C[i, u, (s, s′′)] + C[u + 1, j, (s′′, s′)] is
minimized, where i ≤ u ≤ j and s′′ ∈ {L,R}. Since the number of requests in the
two subintervals, u− i+ 1 and j− u, are shorter than l, by the induction hypothesis,
C[i, u, (s, s′′)] and C[u + 1, j, (s′′, s′)] already store the optimal costs for these two
intervals respectively. In Case II, we buy a long contract to cover the whole interval.
Given a certain server location s′′ at the start of the time ti+1, AMm[i+ 1, j, (s′′, s′)]
already stores the optimal access and migration strategy cost for bandwidth bm for
interval [ti+1, tj]. Therefore, an optimal migration strategy for interval [ti, tj] using
bandwidth bm can be obtained by adding ri to the optimal strategies selected for the
interval [ti + 1, tj] and optimizing over the choice on whether to migrate the server to
serve ri or not (resulting in the two possible choices for s
′′, the position of the server
right after satisfying request ri).
Now we consider the time complexity of the PAYC algorithm. Clearly, the first
phase of the algorithm requires time O(nq). The second phase consists of three nested
loop and has a complexity of O(n2 · (n+ kq)).
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2.4.2 Pay-as-You-Go
Optimal solutions can also be computed for the Pay-as-You-Go model, and the
algorithm PAYG is similar to the algorithm PAYC. As discussed above, in the Pay-
as-You-Come model we need to decide when to migrate, which contracts to buy, and
how much bandwidth to use. In the Pay-as-You-Go model, we still need to make a
decision on when to migrate and how much bandwidth should be reserved, but we
do not have to explicitly decide on a time contract. However, unlike the Pay-as-you-
Come model, in the Pay-as-you-Go model, a bandwith bm has to be chosen and fixed
for satisfying the entire sequence of requests ri, . . . , rj. Also, the contract cost in this
model is directly dependent on the number of migrations of the server, and hence we
explicitly have to keep track of this number.
Algorithm PAYG is listed in Algorithm 2. PAYG uses a new matrix (Am)n×n×4
to store the access cost under a certain bandwidth bm, 1 ≤ m ≤ q, and another
matrix (Nm)n×n×4 is used to store the migration number for bandwidth bm. A matrix
(Cm)n×n×4 stores the total cost for bandwith bm. In the entries of the new matrices,
the elements Am[i, j, (s, s
′)] and Nm[i, j, (s, s′)] store the access cost and the number
of migrations, respectively, for the optimal solution between time ti and tj with an
initial server location s and a final server location s′, where s, s′ ∈ {L,R}. The entry
Cm[i, j, (s, s
′)] stores the total optimal cost within this time period for bandwith bm.
The basic idea behind PAYG is to compute the optimal solution for a scenario
where all the requests require the same bandwidth, and then choose the smallest
cost among all the bandwidth options. PAYG starts off by computing the optimal
costs for satisfying one request (Lines 1-5). Given the request ri and the starting
and ending server locations s, s′, the access cost is given by D[s′, ri] which is 0
if the final server location s′ and the request location ri coincide, and 1 otherwise.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm PAYG
Input: Requests <r1, r2, ..., rn> at respective times <t1, t2, ..., tn>.
Output: Minimum Cost.
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: for all pairs (s, s′) ∈ {L,R}2 and 1 ≤ m ≤ q do
3: Am[i, i, (s, s
′)]← D[s′, ri]
4: Nm[i, i, (s, s
′)]← D[s, s′]
5: Cm[i, i, (s, s
′)]← Am[i, i, (s, s′)] + S ·Nm[i, i, (s, s′)]/bm + f(D[s, s′], bm)
6: for l = 2 to n do
7: for i = 1 to n− l + 1 do
8: j ← i+ l − 1
9: for all pairs(s, s′) ∈ {L,R}2 and 1 ≤ m ≤ q do
10: Cm[i, j, (s, s
′)] ← mini≤u<j;s′′∈{L,R}{Am[i, u, (s, s′′)] + Am[u + 1, j,
(s′′, s′)] + S · (Nm[i, u, (s, s′′)] + Nm[u + 1, j, (s′′, s′)])/bm +
f((Nm[i, u, (s, s
′′)] +Nm[u+ 1, j, (s′′, s′)]), bm)}
11: Let (u, s′′) be the parameter and location of request ru at tu that mini-
mized Line 10.
12: Am[i, j, (s, s
′)]← Am[i, u, (s, s′′)] + Am[u+ 1, j, (s′′, s′)]
13: Nm[i, j, (s, s
′)]← Nm[i, u, (s, s′′)] +Nm[u+ 1, j, (s′′, s′)]
14: return minsfinal∈{L,R}, 1≤m≤q Cm[1, n, (sinit, sfinal)]
Meanwhile D[s, s′] will indicate that the server migrates to the other location to serve
the current request if D[s, s′] is 1. Otherwise, there is no migration, and the starting
and ending server locations s, s′ describe the same node. We store the optimal
solution in the entry Cm[i, i, (s, s
′)] for each bandwidth bm, where Cm[i, i, (s, s′)] =
D[s′, ri] + S ·D[s, s′]/bm + f(D[s, s′], bm).
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Now PAYG iterates over the number of requests l (Line 6). For each value of l, we
compute all the possible cases, as in Lines 7-13. First, we select from [1, n− l−1] the
value i denoting the index of the first of these l requests. Obviously, the index of the
last of the l requests (denoted by j) would be i+ l− 1, as in Line 8. Assume that the
server is located at node s at the time when the ith request occurs, and located at node
s′ at the end of the jth request, where s, s′ ∈ {L,R}. We look for a way to split the
duration such that the total cost Cm[i, j, (s, s
′)] is minimized, as shown in Line 10. We
use u, m, and s′′ to denote the index of the request occurring at the chosen split point,
the chosen bandwidth, and the location of the server (Line 11). Therefore, the total
cost consists of the summation of the access costs of two subintervals, the summation
of the migration costs of two subintervals, and a long contract cost covering the whole
period. Here, the access cost is computed as Am[i, u, (s, s
′′)] + Am[u + 1, j, (s′′, s′)],
the migration cost is computed as (Nm[i, u, (s, s
′′)] +Nm[u+ 1, j, (s′′, s′)])/bm and the
contract cost is computed as f(Nm[i, u, (s, s
′′)]+Nm[u+1, j, (s′′, s′)], bm), for a certain
bandwidth bm. We store the access cost in Am[i, j, (s, s
′)] (Line 12) and the number
of migrations in Nm[i, j, (s, s
′)] (Line 13) for the current duration.
For each bandwidth bm, we store the optimal solution to serve all the requests in
Cm matrix. Thus the optimal cost is hence obtained by computing minsfinal∈(L,R),1≤m≤q
Cm[1, n, (sinit, sfinal)] (Line 14).
The following claim follows by simple induction over the number of requests.
Theorem 2. PAYG (see Algorithm 2) computes the optimal contracts for the Pay-
as-You-Go model. The time complexity is O(qn3), where n is the number of requests
and q is the number of different contract bandwidths.
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2.5 Simulation
The presented economical migration algorithms allow us to shed light on the
properties of the two pricing models. We study three different discount functions
flin, fsqrt, flog which offer cheaper contracts if longer (in terms of days) or larger (in
terms of leased bandwidth) contracts are bought: flin is linear (“get twice as much
for a 50% higher price”), fsqrt grows according to a square root function and hence
describes a steeper discount, and flog even gives an even steeper logarithmic discoun-
t. For all three discount functions, the cost of a one-day contract with 50 Mbit/s
bandwidth is the same, namely fi(1, 50) = 6 for i ∈ {lin, sqrt, log}. Concretely, we
use flin(di, bj) = 1.5 · flin(di/2, bj) = 1.5 · flin(di, bj/2)=1.5(blog dic+bj/50−1) · flin(1, 50),
fsqrt(di, bj) =
√
dibj/50 · fsqrt(1, 50), and flog(di, bj) = log(dibj/50) · flog(1, 50). We
assume a server of size S = 250 MB, and we assume that the access cost for one
remote request is five units (a request originating at the node where the service is lo-
cated is free). We study a scenario where the provider offers two different bandwidth
capacities, namely 50 Mbit/s and 100 Mbit/s, and four types of contract durations,
namely 1, 30, 60 and 100 days (i.e., B = {50, 100} and D = {1, 30, 60, 100}).
We study a simple request pattern where requests originate from two server lo-
cations L and R in turn, e.g., requests originating in Asia alternate with requests
originating in the U.S..
Simplified Demand Scenario: We assume that requests alternate infinitely
between the two sites L and R in the following manner: requests originate from
one site (one per round) for a time interval duration which is chosen according to an
exponential distribution with parameter λ, before requests originate from the opposite
side again (according to the same distribution).
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Figure 2.1: Cost Distribution for PAYC and PAYG.
We simulate n = 1500 requests, and present the average over five runs for each
experiment.
We discuss the following simulations in more detail.
Cost Distribution and Number of Migrations. We analyze how the cost
distributes among the access cost, the migration cost, and the contract cost for the two
algorithms PAYC and PAYG. All experiments discussed here are conducted under
the natural flin discount function. Figure 2.1a shows the absolute costs of PAYC as
a function of λ. We observe that the total cost and the access cost decrease for larger
λ while the migration and contract stay much more stable. This is clear as requests
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Figure 2.2: Number of Migrations and Effect of Discount Function.
originating from one site for longer time periods render it worthwhile to migrate and
buy longer contracts. The contract increases firstly and then decrease after some
point, since the total migration numbers decrease and hence the contract cost is
reduced. As the number of migrations decrease, the average number of migrations
within a contract is also decreased. Therefore, PAYC will buy smaller bandwidth
for such contract, which will result in larger migration costs(also shown in Table 2.2).
Figure 2.1b presents the relative shares of the three costs. While the access costs
approach zero for larger λ since the server is often at the right location, the contract
costs and the migration costs stay stable since PAYC migrates a lot even for larger
λ. The same results for PAYG are shown in Figures 2.1c and 2.1d, respectively. As a
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first takeaway, we see that the cost distribution of Figure 2.1c defers from Figure 2.1a
in that the total costs are lower, i.e., Pay-as-You-Go is always the cheaper option
than Pay-as-You-Come pricing for the customer. Also note that in contrast to the
Pay-as-You-Come model, the migrations constitute a larger share of the overall costs,
since the contract cost is given by the number of migrations and the amount of leased
bandwidth under the discount function; hence the contract cost is lower than the one
of PAYC for the same number of migrations. Moreover, there are relatively more
frequent migrations under the PAYG model, see Figure 2.2a, which also explains
the lower access costs (i.e., this improves QoS experienced by the users). Regarding
the relative cost shares (Figure 2.1d), we can see that the percentage for the access
cost is decreasing while the percentages for the migration cost and the contract cost
are increasing slowly. Again, when λ is large enough and the requests become more
local, since migrations only occur at the beginning of each interval, the number of
migrations (as well as all three cost components) eventually decreases.
Contract Distribution. Different pricing models and scenarios result in different
types and combinations of contracts, and it is interesting to study the frequency (or
popularity) distribution of the contracts. Table 2.1 reports on the average number
of the contracts as a function of λ, for different contract durations and bandwidths,
under the PAYC algorithm and for discount function flin. We see that when λ is
small and migrations are dense, longer duration contracts occur frequently since the
server migrates often. However, as λ increases, all lengths of contracts decrease. As
λ increases, the average number of migrations in a contract decreases and hence the
smaller bandwidth will benefit more than the larger one. Therefore, it turns out to
buy more contracts with smaller bandwidth. This can also be seen in Table 2.2 which
records the average number of migrations in different contracts accordingly (average
over five runs).
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Purchased Contracts (Discount Function flin).
HHHHHHHHHH
Dur-Bw
λ
3 4 5 6 7 8
1-50 11.2 8 15.4 13.8 18.4 39.2
60-50 0 0 0 0 2.4 0.8
60-100 1.4 2 1.4 2.8 1 0.4
100-50 0 0 0 0.6 2 5.4
100-100 11 11 11.2 10 7.6 3.4
Table 2.2: Number of Migrations for Each Contract (Discount Function flin).
HHHHHHHHHH
Dur-Bw
λ
3 4 5 6 7 8
1-50 1 1 1 1 1 1
60-50 0 0 0 0 8,5 0
60-100 17.67 14 13.5 11.5 0 0
100-50 0 0 0 13 13 12.57
100-100 27.33 23.58 19.45 17.33 15 14.5
Impact of Discount Function. Finally, let us compare the different discount
functions in more detail. Figure 2.2b and Figure 2.2c explore the absolute and relative
(in %) cost distributions for PAYC and PAYG under different discount functions.
Clearly, the higher the discount, the smaller the total cost. Moreover, not surprisingly
the performance of PAYG is always better than that of PAYC since the total cost is
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less for PAYG compared to that for PAYC. However, the difference of the costs for
the two models is smaller for higher discounts, i.e., the difference for the logarithmic
discount function is smaller than for a discount function which follows a square root.
2.6 A First Look at Online Migration
Although the main focus of this work is on predictable demand scenarios and
offline algorithms, in this section, we want to initiate the discussion of online algo-
rithms. The online discussion builds upon our offline results in two respects: First,
some algorithmic techniques from the offline variant may be used also for the online
variants. For example, an online algorithm may try to predict the future from the
past, and apply an optimal offline algorithm on a sequence of recent past requests in
order to make decisions on how to deal with upcoming requests. Second, offline algo-
rithms are often needed to evaluate the performance of an online algorithm. The ratio
of the cost of an online algorithm divided by the cost of an optimal offline algorithm
is also known as the competitive ratio [5].
Both online algorithms presented in the following are inspired by the (optimal)
offline variants and seek to amortize costs over time. To simplify the presentation,
we assume a constant bandwidth scenario.
OnC: The online Pay-as-You-Come algorithm OnC tracks the access costs it
incurs at the current location using a counter C. Once the counter exceeds the
migration cost (given by the server size divided by the bandwidth), OnC migrates
the server and resets C. If there is currently no contract available for migration,
OnC checks whether a contract longer than the most recently used contract would
have been better for the past requests. Concretely, OnC checks longer contracts one
by one (in increasing order of length) and compares their costs in the corresponding
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intervals (starting from the last migration) to the cost OnC incurred during that
time period. As soon as a better contract is found, it is chosen. Otherwise, OnC
checks whether a contract shorter than the most recent contract should be chosen.
The following heuristic is applied: OnC checks whether during the last contract, the
number of migrations was larger in the first half or the second half of the contract
time interval. In case of the first half, OnC will buy the shorter contract; otherwise,
OnC chooses the same contract as last time.
Now let us discuss a simple online algorithm OnG for the Pay-as-You-Go model.
Since the customers only need to pay for the resources actually consumed, OnG just
needs to decide when to migrate.
OnG: Let the counter C1 record the number of the migrations performed so far
and let the counter C2 denote the total access costs. If the access cost C2 reaches the
migration cost plus marginal migration contract costs (i.e., f(C1 +1, b)−f(C1, b), for
bandwidth b), OnG migrates the server, increments counter C1, and resets counter
C2.
Given our optimal offline algorithms, it is interesting to study the competitive
ratio of OnC and OnG. We study three different discount functions flin, fsqrt, flog
which offer cheaper contracts if longer (in terms of days) or larger (in terms of leased
bandwidth) contracts are bought: flin is linear (“get twice as much for a 50% higher
price”), fsqrt grows according to a square root function and hence describes a steeper
discount, and flog even gives an even steeper logarithmic discount. For all three
discount functions, the cost of a one-day contract with 50 Mbit/s bandwidth is the
same, namely fi(1, 50) = 6 for i ∈ {lin, sqrt, log}. Concretely, we use flin(di, bj) = 1.5·
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flin(di/2, bj) = 1.5·flin(di, bj/2)=1.5(blog dic+bj/50−1)·flin(1, 50), fsqrt(di, bj) =
√
dibj/50·
fsqrt(1, 50), and flog(di, bj) = log(dibj/50) · flog(1, 50). We assume a server of size
S = 250 MB, and we assume that the access cost for one remote request is five units
(a request originating at the node where the service is located is free). We study
a scenario where the provider offers two different bandwidth capacities, namely 50
Mbit/s and 100 Mbit/s, and four types of contract durations, namely 1, 30, 60 and
100 days (i.e., B = {50, 100} and D = {1, 30, 60, 100}).
The competitive ratios for OnC and OnG are presented in Figure 2.3. We observe
that the ratios for both algorithms are relatively small (between 1.5 and 4) and
decrease for larger λ (lower dynamics). This can be explained by the fact that with
higher λ, requests remain more local and migration patterns more obvious. A second
takeaway is that the competitive ratio for the lowest discount function flin is best,
while higher discounts like flog are handled worse by our online algorithms. Especially
in the Pay-as-You-Come model, our online algorithm has more difficulties to deal
with high discounts, as it tends to buy too many short contracts (OnC migrates
more often than the offline algorithm). Also under Pay-as-You-Go pricing, the offline
algorithm can exploit discounts relatively better, although to a lesser extent. (The
offline algorithm migrates relatively more frequently for higher discounts.)
2.7 Conclusion
There is a large body of literature on economical aspects of cloud computing, but
much less is known about efficient (virtual) network pricing. Interestingly, while cloud
(or node) resources are often priced according to a flexible per-use or pay-as-you-go
policy, networking services such as MPLS connectivity are often charged according to
usage-independent, time-based policies [40]. This is particularly surprising as network
demand is likely to exhibit a higher variance over time than, e.g., storage resources.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Discount Function on Competitive Ratio. We Simulate 1500
Requests and Present the Average over Five Runs.
For instance, distributed SAP systems may be fully synchronized only sporadically
(but then lead to high network loads), whereas the resource requirements of, e.g., a
mail service normally grows monotonically over time.
We understand this work as a first step to study the effect of virtual network
pricing policies on service migration. We focused on the offline setting where demand
patterns are given (e.g., describe regular time-of-day or commuter effects). Such on-
line algorithms can also be useful to evaluate the competitive ratio of online algorithms
in simulations. We presented two optimal algorithms for efficient service migration
in different economic settings. We believe that the used algorithmic techniques are
relatively general and can be extended to more complex scenarios, e.g., to networks
supporting live migration or more complex virtual network topologies.
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Chapter 3
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR ONLINE CLOUD RESOURCE
ALLOCATION WITH DISCOUNTS: THE 2-DIMENSIONAL PARKING PERMIT
PROBLEM
3.1 Introducation
As the Internet becomes increasingly virtualized, resources can be allocated more
flexibly and at large scale. Virtualization not only introduces an Internet-wide re-
source market, but also new business models. For example, a startup company run-
ning a webservice no longer needs to invest in its own infrastructure, but can dy-
namically lease cloud resources to provide the service to its users in a cost-efficient
manner. Also a hybrid model is possible where the cloud resources are just used to
complement a limited own infrastructure in peak demand times (a.k.a. “cloud burst-
ing”). New business models are also introduced by resource brokering opportunities:
a broker may lease a large amount of resources from different providers and resell
them to its customers (at a higher price).
This work studies the problem of a (cloud) customer who rents resource bundles
from a (cloud) provider, in order to offer a certain service to its users (or to resell
the resources). The customer is faced with the challenge that its resource demand
(e.g., the popularity of its webservice) is not known in advance. In order to ensure
that its resource demand is satisfied at any time, and in order to avoid a costly over-
provisioning of the service, additional resources must be bought in an online manner.
The online resource allocation problem may further be complicated by the fact that
the provider offers discounts for larger and longer resource contracts.
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The goal of the customer is to come up with a smart resource renting strategy to
satisfy its dynamic and unpredictable resource demand, while minimizing the overall
costs of the bought resource bundles.
Our Contributions. This work shows that at the heart of efficient cloud re-
source allocation lies a fundamental algorithmic problem, and makes the following
contributions. We first observe that the problem of renting a single resource over
time can be seen as a 2-dimensional variant of the well-known online Parking Per-
mit Problem (PPP). While in the classic parking permit problem, only the contract
durations need to be chosen, in the 2-dimensional variant PPP2 introduced in this
work, also the resource rates are subject to optimization.
Our main contribution is the deterministic online algorithm On2D whose perfor-
mance is close to the one of a clairvoyant optimal offline algorithm which knows the
entire resource demand in advance: On2D provably achieves a competitive ratio of
O(k), where k is the total number of available resource contracts; this is asymptoti-
cally optimal in the sense that there cannot exist any deterministic online algorithm
with competitive ratio o(k).
We also give a constructive proof that the offline variant of the PPP2 problem
can be solved in polynomial time, by presenting a dynamic programming algorithm
Off2D accordingly. To the best of our knowledge, Off2D is also the first offline
algorithm to efficiently solve PPP and PPP2 for long enough request sequences σ.
Off2D is used as a subroutine in On2D.
Finally, we show that our algorithms and results also generalize to multi-resource
scenarios, i.e., to higher-dimensional parking permit problems.
Work Organization. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 3.2 reviews related work. Section 3.3 formally introduces our model. Section 3.4
presents our online algorithm. In detail, we discuss an example and provides intuition
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for the analysis, and present the general analysis in this section . We show that our
algorithm is almost optimal by deriving a lower bound in Section 3.5. Section 3.6
presents a polynomial-time optimal offline algorithm, and Section 3.7 shows how to
extend our results from 2-dimensions to D-dimensions (for a constant D). Finally,
we conclude our work in Section 3.9.
3.2 Related Work
Cost reductions (due to economy-of-scale effects) are arguably the main moti-
vation behind today’s trend to out-source infrastructure and software to the cloud.
Accordingly, a large body of literature in the field focuses on resource allocation and
scheduling problems: the more virtual services that can be multiplexed on a given
physical network, the better the resource sharing and hence provider revenue. For a
good overview of the field, we refer the reader to the surveys [4, 14]. We will structure
the discussion of related works according to the following categories: cloud network
performance, economic models, and online optimization algorithms.
Cloud Network Performance. This work assumed that the service of the cloud
customer comes with hard resource requirements, which is motivated by the varying
and often unpredictable performance in today’s oversubscribed datacenters. Indeed,
several studies have shown that services and applications without strict performance
isolation suffer from poor performance. [32] Accordingly, researchers have proposed to
make resource reservations more explicit and also provide bandwidth isolation. For
example, SecondNet [22] and Oktopus [6] introduce the notion of virtual networks
that provide the illusion of a dedicated network, specified as a graph resp. Hose
model. Proteus [46] generalizes these concepts in the time-dimension, supporting
a flexible interleaving of reservations over time. In order to deal with unexpected
external interference and failures, Q-Clouds [33] saves certain resource which can
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be allocated to mask interrupting events. For a good overview on cloud network
performance issues, we refer the reader to [32]. Virtual services and networks have
also been investigated outside datacenters. Especially Software-Defined Networking
and Network Function Virtualization offer appealing innovation opportunities to ISPs,
and allow the introduction of new services in the network core. [13, 48]
Economic Roles and Challenges. Compared to the algorithmic problem-
s of the resource allocation and scheduling, the economical aspects are less well-
understood. Different economical cloud models have been proposed and compared
by various authors, e.g., by Armbrust et al. [30], Pal et al. [34], or Dash et al. [17].
Some of the studied pricing models have their origins in the context of ISP-customer
relationships [42] and are also related to classic economic problems [20]. An inter-
esting tradeoff between time and price has been studied in [25], from a scheduling
complexity perspective. More generally, there are several interesting proposals for
novel adaptive resource and spot market pricing schemes, e.g., [1].
Our role model is motivated by the network virtualization architecture presented
by Schaffrath et al. [39]: the authors identify stakeholders and new economical roles,
and distinguish between a physical infrastructure provider, a virtual network provider
(i.e., resource reseller or broker), a virtual network operator and a service provider.
In the terminology used in this work, the physical infrastructure provider corresponds
to our provider, and the virtual network provider corresponds to the customer. The
customer and broker role more arises in virtualization architectures allowing for sub-
renting and recursion [12, 39].
Online Algorithms and the Parking Permit Problem. The work closest to
ours is the Parking Permit Problem (PPP) work [31]. Analogously to the classic ski-
rental problem, PPP is the archetype for online problems where purchases have time
durations which expire regardless of whether the purchase is used or not. Formally,
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PPP specifies a set of k different types of parking permits of a certain price pii
and duration di. In [31], Meyerson presents an asymptotically optimal deterministic
online algorithm with competitive ratio O(k) (together with a lower bound of Ω(k)).
The work also discusses randomized algorithms and an application to Steiner forests.
While we can build upon some of the techniques in [31], the rate dimension renders
the problem rather different in nature, both from an online and an offline algorithm
perspective.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any work on online algorithms
for two-dimensional, time and rate based resource rental problems.
More generally, online problems with discounts have also been studied in various
contexts already, especially rental [47] and ticket purchase problems [19]. There
also exist online algorithms with provable competitive ratios for other optimization
problems arising in the context of cloud computing and network virtualization, such
as online access control [7, 18] or service migration [9].
3.3 Model
We attend to the following setting (for an illustration, see Figure 3.1). We consider
a customer with a dynamically changing resource demand. We model this resource
demand as a sequence σ = (σt)t, where σt refers to the resource demand at time t.
We use σ̂ to denote maxt σt. The customer is faced with the challenge that its future
resource requirements are hard to predict, and may change in a worst-case manner
over time: We are in the realm of online algorithms and competitive analysis.
In order to cover its resource demand, the customer buys resource contracts from
a (cloud) provider. For ease of presentation, we will focus on a single resource scenario
for most of our work; however, we will also show that our results can be extended
to multi-resource scenarios. Concretely, we assume that the provider offers different
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Model: A Customer Has to Cover Its Resource Demand
σ by Buying Contracts C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck} from the Provider. Larger Contracts Ci
Come with a Price Discount (Price pi(Ci)).
resource contracts C(r, d) of resource rate r and duration d. We will refer to the
set of available contracts by C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}. Each contract type has a price
pi(C) = pi(r, d), which depends on its rate r(C) = r and its duration d(C) = d. We
will assume that resource contracts have a monotonically increasing rate-duration
product r × d, and will denote by Ci the ith largest contract.
A specific contract instance of type Ci will be denoted by C
(j)
i , for some index j.
Each instance C
(j)
i of contract type Ci(r, d) has a specific start time t
(j)
i , and we will
sometimes refer to a contract instance by C
(j)
i (t
(j)
i , ri, di). The identifiers are needed
since multiple contracts of the same type can be stacked in our model, but will be
omitted if the contract is clear from the context.
We will make three simplifying assumptions:
A1 Monotonic Prices: Prices are monotonically increasing, i.e., larger contracts
are more expensive than shorter contracts: pi(Ci−1) < pi(Ci) since ri−1× di−1 <
ri × di for any i.
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A2 Multiplicity: The duration and resource rate of a contract of type Ci(ri, di) are
perfect multiples of the duration and rate, respectively, of contract Ci−1(ri−1, di−1).
That is, we assume that di = x · di−1 and ri = y · ri−1 for fixed bases x, y ≥ 2.
Moreover, w.l.o.g.1 we will assume that the smallest contract has d1 = 1 and
r1 = 1.
A3 Intervals: We assume that a contract of duration d can only be bought at time
t0 + i · d, where t0 = 0 is the start time.
Figure 3.2: The Interval Model with Four Different Contracts: Each Contract C(r, d)
Can only Be Bought at Time t0 + i · d.
Assumption A1 is natural: contracts which are dominated by larger, cheaper
contracts may simply be ignored. Assumption A2 restricts the variety of available
contracts the customer can choose from, and constitutes the main simplification made
in this work. Assumption A3 mainly serves the ease of presentation: as we will
prove in this work (and as it has already been shown for the classic Parking Permit
1Without loss of generality.
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Problem [31]), an offline or online algorithm limited by the interval model is at most
a factor of two off the respective optimal solution in the general model.
Now, let On be some online algorithm, let Ct(On) denote the set of contracts
bought according to On at time t and let C≤t(On) denote the set of contracts bought
according to On through time t. We will use the notation C∗t (On) ⊆ C≤t(On) to
describe the set of active contracts at time t: i.e., contracts Ci(ti, ri, di) bought by
On with ti ≤ t < ti + di. Likewise we denote the set of contracts bought by an
optimal offline algorithm Off to cover the demand prefix σ1, ..., σt until time t by
C≤t(Off).
Since a correct algorithm must ensure that there are always sufficient resources
to cover the current demand, the invariant
∑
C(r,d)∈C∗t (On) r ≥ σt must hold at any
moment of time t. We will use the one-lookahead model [11] frequently considered
in online literature, and allow an online algorithm to buy a contract at time t before
serving the request σt; however, On does not have any information at all about σt′
for t′ > t.
The goal is to minimize the overall price piσ(On) =
∑
C∈C≤t(On) pi(C). More specif-
ically, we seek to be competitive against an optimal offline algorithm and want to
minimize the competitive ratio ρ of On: We compare the price piσ(On) of the online
algorithm On under the external (online) demand σ, to the price piσ(Off) paid by an
optimal offline algorithm Off, which knows the entire demand σ in advance. Formal-
ly, we assume a worst-case perspective and want to minimize the (strict) competitive
ratio ρ for any σ: ρ = maxσ piσ(On)/piσ(Off).
We are interested in long demand sequences σ; in particular, we will assume that
the length of σ, |σ|, is at least as large as the largest single demand σt.
Our problem is an interesting variant of the classic Parking Permit Problem
PPP [31], which we review quickly in the following. In PPP, a driver has to choose
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between k parking permits of different durations and costs in order to satisfy all of
his/her parking needs while minimizing the total cost paid. More precisely, the driver
has a sequence of days when he/she needs a parking space at a parking garage and
there are k different parking permits, where each parking permit Pi allows the driver
to use one parking space for di consecutive days at a cost of ci. In the online version
of the problem, the sequence of days when the driver will need a parking space is not
known in advance.
3.4 Competitive Online Algorithm
This section presents the deterministic online algorithm On2D for the PPP2
problem. As a subroutine, in order to determine which contracts to buy at time t,
On2D uses an optimal offline algorithm Off2D that computes optimal contracts for
a prefix σ≤t of the demand through time t. In this section, we will treat Off2D as a
black box, but will describe a polynomial-time construction later in Section 3.6 of this
chapter. Moreover, for ease of presentation, by default we will focus on the Interval
Model. (The competitive ratio increases at most by a factor 2 in the general model.)
3.4.1 The Algorithm
In order to formally describe and analyze our algorithm, we propose a scheme that
assigns bought contracts to the 2-dimensional time-demand plane (see Figure 3.2 for
an illustration). Our model requires that each point below the demand curve σ
is covered by a contract, i.e., the mapping of contracts to demand points must be
surjective.
We pursue the following strategy to assign contracts to the time-demand plane:
at any time t, we order the set of active contracts by their duration, and stack the
active contracts in such a way that longer contracts are embedded lower in the plane,
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i.e., the longest running contract Ci(ri, di) covers the demand from 1 to ri, the next
shorter contract Cj(rj, dj) then covers the demand ri + 1 to ri + rj, and so on. This
guarantees a unique mapping of a demand point p(time, demand) at time t to a
contract Ci for the offline algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Online Algorithm On2D
Input: Demand prefix σ≤t = σ1, σ2, ..., σt; set of contracts C≤t−1(On2D) bought by
On2D through time t− 1
Output: Contracts to be bought at time t: Ct(On2D)
1: Ct(Off2D)← Off2D(σ1, σ2, ..., σt)
2: for C ∈ Ct(Off2D) do
3: if ∃ demand point p covered by C such that p is not covered by C≤t−1(On2D)
then
4: Ct(On2D).add(C)
5: return Ct(On2D)
Our online algorithm On2D (see Algorithm 3) is based on an oracle Off2D com-
puting optimal offline solutions for the demand so far. On2D uses these solutions to
purchase contracts at time t. Concretely, On2D mimics the offline algorithm in an
efficient way, in the sense that it only buys the optimal offline contracts covering time
t if the corresponding demand is not already covered by contracts bought previously
by On2D: At each time t, On2D compares the set of previously bought contracts
C≤t−1(On2D) with the set of contracts Ct(Off2D) that Off2D would buy for an of-
fline demand sequence σ1, ..., σt; On2D then only buys the contracts C ∈ Ct(Off2D)
for the demand at time t that is not covered by C≤t−1(On2D).
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3.4.2 Case Study
In order to provide some intuition of the behavior of On2D, as a case study, we
consider the special scenario where contracts are perfect squares, i.e., Ci = (2
i−1, 2i−1),
and where the contract prices have a specific discount structure, namely pi(Ci) =
2 · Ci−1, with pi(C1) = 1. This price function ensures that Off2D will buy at most
one Cj contract before it is worthwhile to buy the next larger contract Cj+1 for the
given time interval.
Let us now study the maximal cumulative price Π(Ci). It is easy to see that
under the price function above, the demand sequence σ with a constant demand
of one unit per time, maximizes Π(Ci) for Ci = (2
i−1, 2i−1) and pi(Ci) = 2 · Ci−1:
higher demands imply missed opportunities to charge On2D for smaller contracts,
as already a demand of two at given time t renders it worthwhile to buy C2, and a
demand of four renders it worthwhile to buy C3, etc.
With the given demand σ, Off2D will end up buying each of the smaller contracts
once before it buys the next larger contract. The cumulative price derived from σ
according to this behavior is Π(Ci) =
∑i−1
j=1 Π(Cj) + pi(Ci). We prove this claim by
induction over the contract types i. For the base case i = 1, Π(Ci) = pi(Ci) holds
trivially. Assuming the induction hypothesis for i we have:
Π(Ci+1) =
i∑
j=1
Π(Cj) + pi(Ci+1)
=
i−1∑
j=1
Π(Cj) + Π(Ci) + pi(Ci+1)
IH
=
i−1∑
j=1
Π(Cj) +
i−1∑
j=1
Π(Cj) + pi(Ci) + pi(Ci+1)
Due to the induction hypothesis, the cost of a quarter of 2i+1x2i+1 is maximized
for
∑i−1
j=1 Π(Cj) + pi(Ci). In order to maximize the cost in the second quarter (at the
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bottom of the time-demand plane) Off2D would need to buy
∑i−1
j=1 Π(Cj) again and
instead of buying a second contract Ci the pricing scheme would lead to the purchase
of contract Ci+1. Therefore buying the same contracts again (despite Ci) must lead
to Π(Ci+1) =
∑i
j=1 Π(Cj) + pi(Ci+1).
Figure 3.3: Worst-case Example Where σt = 1 ∀t. While Off2D at Time Point d5
Buys a Single Contract C5, On2D Is Forced to Buy all the Depicted Contracts, in
Addition to C5. For Instance, Buys C1 in Every Second Time Step.
In conclusion, for the considered price function, we have derived a worst-case
sequence σ, that shows that On2D achieves a k-competitive ratio.
Theorem 3. For the special setting considered in our case study, On2D is k-competitive.
Proof. Consider the discussed worst-case sequence σ, where On2D has to buy every
contract (total cost Π(Ci)) while Off2D can simply buy Ci at price pi(Ci). We can
show that Π(Ci) ≤ i · pi(Ci) and hence Π(Ci) ≤ k · pi(Ci). According to the observed
behavior of Off2D, every second contract bought by On2D is C1 (2
i−2 times), every
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fourth is C2 (2
i−3 times), etc., and finally On2D also buys Ci. See Figure 3.3 for an
example. Thus,
Π(Ci) = 2
i−2 · pi(C1) + 2i−3 · pi(C2) + · · ·+ 1 · pi(Ci)
= 2i−2 · 20 + 2i−3 · 21 + · · ·+ 2i−i · 2i−2 + 1 · 2i−1
≤ 2i−1 + 2i−1 + 2i−1 + · · ·+ 2i−1 + 2i−1
= i · 2i−1 = i · pi(Ci)
3.4.3 General Analysis
With these intuitions in mind, we now present a general analysis of On2D. First,
we derive some simple properties of the contracts bought by the optimal offline algo-
rithm Off2D over time. Let us fix an arbitrary demand point p, i.e., a point below
the σ-curve in the time-demand plane. We make the following claim: if p is covered
by a certain contract C in C≤t(Off2D), p will never be covered by a smaller contract
C ′ in Ct′(Off2D) for any t′ > t. In other words, when considering a longer offline
demand sequence σ1, . . . , σt′ , Off2D will never buy a smaller contract than C to
cover the demand point p. This property of “growing contracts” together with the
assumption of disjoint intervals motivates the notion of contract independence, which
we formalize in the lemma below:
Lemma 1 (Contract Independence). Consider a demand point pi covered by con-
tract Ci ∈ C≤t(Off2D) and a demand point pj covered by a distinct contract Cj ∈
C≤t(Off2D). Then there does not exist a contract C ∈ Ct′(Off2D) for any t′ < t
such that pi, pj are covered by C. We say that the two contracts Ci and Cj are inde-
pendent.
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Independence between contracts is always trivially ensured in our model. This
enables a simple characterization of the scenarios maximizing the competitive ratio.
Lemma 2. The competitive ratio is maximized in a scenario where Off2D buys only
one contract to satisfy the entire demand σ.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume Off2D buys more than one contract, say Ci and
Cj. Now assume that over time, On2D buys a set of (possibly smaller) contracts
Ci′ , Ci′′ , . . . to cover the demand points of Ci and Cj′ , Cj′′ , . . . to cover the demand
points of Cj. Thus, On2D pays pi(Ci) +pi(Ci′) + . . . and pi(Cj) +pi(Cj′) + . . . whereas
Off2D pays pi(Ci) and pi(Cj); the resulting competitive ratio is ρCi = (pi(Ci) +
pi(Ci′)+. . .)/pi(Ci) for the Ci part and ρCj = (pi(Cj)+pi(Cj′)+. . .)/pi(Cj) respectively.
Since all contracts in Off2D are independent, the competitive ratio ρ of Off2D will
be max{ρCi , ρCj} which would also be achieved if the larger contract was the only one
bought by Off2D.
We hence want to show that On2D will never buy too many small contracts to
cover a demand for which Off2D would later only buy one contract. Concretely, let
us fix any contract Ci ∈ C≤t(Off2D), and let us study the set of contracts S bought
by On2D during the time interval [0, t) which overlap with Ci in the time-demand
plane. Recall that S will only contain distinct instances of the contracts (since On2D
does not buy “repeated” contracts) and it will be contained in ∪t′<tCt′(Off2D). By
the interval and independence property, we know that contracts in S are all “inside”
Ci, i.e., do not exceed its boundary in the plane. Accordingly, we can compute an
upper bound on the maximum cumulative price spent on contracts in S by On2D
while Off2D at time t only bought a single contract Ci at price pi. In the following,
let us refer to this cumulative price paid by On2D by Π(Ci) =
∑
C∈S pi(C).
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Lemma 3. The maximum cumulative price paid by On2D to cover a contract Ci,
Π(Ci), is less than or equal to i · pi(Ci), for any i ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider a contract Ci ∈ C≤t(Off2D) and S as defined above. Let ` be such
thatOn2D has bought ` contracts Ci−1 to cover the area of Ci during time [0, t), where
0 ≤ ` ≤ pi(Ci)
pi(Ci−1)
. For all other C ∈ S, we must have C ∈ {C1, . . . , Ci−2}. Let S ′ =
{C ∈ S, s.t. C ∈ {C1, . . . , Ci−2}}. Hence we have
∑
C∈S′ pi(C) ≤ pi(Ci)− ` · pi(Ci−1),
since the area covered by all contracts in S is at most equal to the area covered by
Ci, and given Assumption A1. We argue by induction on i.
Base case i = 1: If there is just one type of contract C1, the online algorithm will
buy the same contracts as the offline algorithm, and the claim holds trivially.
Inductive step i > 1: Assuming the induction hypothesis holds for all j < i, we
have:
Π(Ci) = ` · Π(Ci−1) + pi(Ci) +
∑
C
(p)
j ∈S′
Π(C
(p)
j )
≤ ` · (i− 1) · pi(Ci−1) + pi(Ci) +
∑
C
(p)
j ∈S′
j · pi(Cj)
≤ ` · (i− 1) · pi(Ci−1) + pi(Ci) + (i− 2)
∑
C
(p)
j ∈S′
pi(Cj)
≤ ` · (i− 1) · pi(Ci−1) + pi(Ci) + (i− 2) [pi(Ci)− ` · pi(Ci−1)]
= ` · pi(Ci−1) + (i− 1) · pi(Ci)
≤ pi(Ci)
pi(Ci−1)
· pi(Ci−1) + (i− 1) · pi(Ci)
= pi(Ci) + (i− 1) · pi(Ci) = i · pi(Ci)
With these results, we can derive the competitive ratio. According to Lemma 3,
for each contract C
(j)
i ∈ C≤t(Off2D), the accumulated cost Π(C(j)i ) is bounded
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by i · pi(Ci). Therefore, summing up all the accumulated costs of each contract
in C≤t(Off2D), we get the total cost of On2D at time t. Note that every con-
tract bought by On2D must be totally covered by contracts in Ct(Off2D), since
Ct(Off2D) is an optimal solution for the entire demand sequence σ≤t and the con-
tract independence property holds. Since we have k different contracts and for each
contract Ci in Ct(Off2D), we have Π(Ci) ≤ i · pi(Ci) ≤ k · pi(Ci), and:
Theorem 4. On2D is k-competitive, where k is the total number of contracts.
As we will show in Section 3.5, this is almost optimal.
Finally, observe that restricting On2D to Assumption A3 does not come at a
large cost.
Theorem 5. Let Alg1 be an optimal offline algorithm for PPP
2, and let Alg2
be an optimal offline algorithm for PPP2 where we relax Assumption A3. Then
pi(Alg2) ≤ pi(Alg1) ≤ 2 · pi(Alg2).
Proof. Consider any contract C
(m)
i (ri, di) bought by an optimal offline algorithm for
PPP2 without Assumption A3. When time is divided into intervals of length di, C
(m)
i
will overlap in time at most two contracts C
(j)
i and C
(l)
i of duration di. Therefore, we
can modify the optimal solution output by Alg2 by purchasing those two contracts
instead of C
(m)
i , eventually transforming the optimal solution output by Alg2 into
a feasible solution for PPP2 (under Assumption A3). Hence, we can guarantee that
pi(Alg2) ≤ pi(Alg1) ≤ 2 · pi(Alg2).
Hence, since On2D is k-competitive under Assumption A3 (Theorem 4), and since
the optimal offline cost is at most a factor of two lower without the interval model
(Theorem 3.4.3), we have:
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Corollary 1. On2D is 2k-competitive for the general PPP2 problem without As-
sumption A3, where k is the number of contracts.
3.5 Lower Bound
Theorem 4 is essentially the best we can hope for:
Theorem 6. No deterministic online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio less
than k/3.
The proof is the 2-dimensional analogon of the proof in [31]. We consider a scenario
where the next larger available contract doubles in cost. With k being the number of
different contracts, each contract is 2k times longer and has 2k times more rate, i.e.,
in our plane representation contracts are squares covering an area (2k)2i.
pi(Ci) = 2
i−1
r1 = 1; ri = 2k · ri−1 = (2k)i−1
d1 = 1; di = 2k · di−1 = (2k)i−1
In the following, let us focus on a simple demand which only assumes rates σt ∈
{0, 1} for all t. We let the adversary schedule demand only when On has no valid
contract. For each interval (2k)i where the adversary asks for a 1-demand, On can
choose between three options (see also Figure 3.4):
1 Eventual purchase of contract Ci. Assume that this happens ni times.
2 Eventual purchase of larger contracts Cj, j > i. Assume that this happens∑k
j>i nj times.
3 Never purchase contract Ci or any larger contracts. Assume this happens mi
times.
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Figure 3.4: On Buys ni = 4 Contracts Ci and ni+1 = 1 Contract Ci+1 over Seven
Intervals of Length di. In Two of These Seven Intervals On Buys Several Contracts
Smaller than Ci to Cover the Demand.
Thus the sum of all contracts bought by On is given by pi(On) =
∑k
i=1 ni ·
pi(Ci). Given an interval of length `, we estimate the cost of Off by less than buying
multiples of only one kind of contract over the full interval, i.e., `/di contracts for any
i: pi(Off) ≤ pi(Ci)(mi +
∑k
j≥i nj). In order to derive the lower bound we first prove
a minimum cost of any algorithm On on intervals that start with a demand rate of
1.
Lemma 4. Any On must pay at least pi(Ci) on each interval of length di that starts
with a demand rate of 1.
Proof. By induction on the different intervals 2i−1. For i = 1, each algorithm must at
least buy a contract of type C1 in order to cover that demand. Assume that for i− 1,
it holds and now let us argue for i. If On does not buy a contract of type Ci, we can
divide the volume into (2k)2 squares with side length di−1 each, where 2k · di−1 = di.
We let each of these 2k intervals (at the bottom row) start with a demand of 1 which
then cost at least pi(Ci−1) due to the induction hypothesis. The total cost is at least
2k · pi(Ci−1) = k · pi(Ci) for every interval where On does not buy a contract i and at
least pi(Ci) otherwise.
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Consider now an interval of length (2k)i−1 where no contract of type i or higher
was bought. We know from the induction that pi(On) ≥ mi · k ·pi(Ci). We can derive
the following lower bound:
k · pi(Off) ≤
k∑
i=0
[
pi(Ci)(mi +
k∑
j≥i
nj)
]
(3.1)
≤
k∑
i=0
[
ni
i∑
j=1
pi(Ci) +mi · pi(Ci)
]
(3.2)
≤
k∑
i=0
[2ni · pi(Ci) +mi · pi(Ci)] (3.3)
≤ 3 · pi(On) (3.4)
Inequality (3.1) is given by the cost estimation of Off against any On buying
only one kind of contracts. Inequality (3.2) is a reorganization of the sum since pi(Ci)
is multiplied by every nj, j ≥ i which is also given after the reordering. Afterwards,
we use the geometric sum on the cost of the contracts to derive Inequality (3.3). This
leads to a lower bound of k/3 since pi(On) =
∑k
i=1 ni ·pi(Ci) and pi(On) ≥ mi ·k ·pi(Ci).
3.6 Optimal Offline Algorithm
So far, we have treated the optimal offline algorithm on which On2D relies as a
black box. In the following, we show that offline solutions can indeed be computed
in polynomial time, and present a dynamic programming algorithm Off2D.
The basic idea behind the offline algorithm Off2D is that the optimal cost for
any contract over a certain interval is obtained either by splitting the cost at some
time, or by buying a long contract with a certain rate r. In the following, recall that
dk is the duration of the largest contract Ck.
Off2D proceeds as follows: It splits time into intervals of length dk and solves
each of these interval separately. Off2D relies on the following data structures: For
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each dk-length time interval I, we precompute the maximum demand within any
subinterval [i, j] of I, and store this information in position M [i, j] of a dk×dk matrix
M (Algorithm 4). In particular the maximum requested demand σˆ in interval I is
stored in M [1, dk]. A dk× dk× σˆ matrix OP is used to compute the optimal cost. The
entry OP[i, j, λ] indicates the optimal cost of covering a demand rate of M [i, j]−λ over
the interval [i, j] — i.e. λ indicates the amount of covered demand for [i, j]. Initially,
all entries are set to 0.
Algorithm 4 Pre-computation of matrix M
Input: Demand sequence σt, . . . , σt+dk (over interval [t, t+ dk]).
Output: Matrix M .
1: for i = 1 to dk do
2: M [i, i]← σt+i
3: for i = 1 to dk − 1 do
4: for j = i+ 1 to dk do
5: M [i, j]← max{M [i, j − 1], σt+j}
6: return M
Algorithm 4 pre-computes the matrix M over the dk-length interval [t, t + dk],
where t = b · dk, for integer b ≥ 0. Lines 1-2 initialize the matrix and store the
demand σt+i in entry M [i, i]. Lines 3-5 compute the maximum demand within any
time interval [t+ i, t+ j], 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ dk. The demand can be obtained by comparing
the demand at time t + j (i.e., σt+j) with the maximum demand between time t + i
and t+ j − 1, which has already been computed by our algorithm.
After obtaining the matrix M over interval [t, t+dk], we can compute the optimal
solution for PPP2 problem over the same interval using Algorithm 5.
For the sake of ease of explanation, we assume that t = 0 in the arguments that
follows. Off2D computes the optimal cost for any interval [i, j] by either combining
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Algorithm 5 Offline Algorithm Off2D
Input: Precomputed matrix M over interval [t, t+ dk].
Output: Optimal total costs OP for all intervals within [t, t+ dk].
1: Initialize all entries in OP to be 0.
2: for i = 1 to dk do
3: for λ = M [i, i]− 1 to 0 do
4: OP[i, i, λ]← minC(r,d)∈C{OP[i, i,min{σˆ, λ+ r}] + pi(r, d)
5: for ` = 2 to dk do
6: for i = 1 to dk − `+ 1 do
7: j = i+ `− 1
8: for λ = M [i, j]− 1 to 0 do
9: OP[i, j, λ]← mini≤z<j{OP[i, z, λ] + OP[z + 1, j, λ]}
10: C ′ ← {C(x)(t(x), r, d) ∈ C : t(x) = b · d for some positive integer b and
t(x) ≤ i < j ≤ t(x) + d}
11: if C ′ is not empty then
12: OP[i, j, λ]← min{OP[i, j, λ]; minC(r,d)∈C′ OP[i, j,min{σˆ, λ+ r}] + pi(r, d)}
13: return OP[1, dk, 0]
the independent optimal solutions obtained for the subintervals [i, z] and [z+ 1, j], or
by buying a long contract that covers a demand of r over the entire interval [i, j]. Note
that according to Assumptions A1 and A2, these are the only two necessary options
to consider. In the former case, it is obvious that the best splitting of the interval
will give the minimum cost. In the latter case, a long contract with certain rate r is
bought, however, the rate r may be lower than the maximum demand, M [i, j], over
[i, j]: In this case, we need to take into account how to best cover any remaining
uncovered demand in [i, j], which has been computed in OP[i, j, λ+ r].
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Theorem 7. Off2D computes an optimal offline solution for any given interval of
length dk in time O(d
3
k · σ̂), where σ̂ is the maximum demand over the interval.
Proof. We again assume for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, that
t = 0 and the dk-length interval we consider is [0, dk].
Correctness: By induction over the length of the subintervals ` = j− i+1 and the
respective uncovered demand λ. Clearly, the claim is true for intervals [i, i] (` = 1)
(Lines 2-4): If λ > 0 we need at least one contract C(r, d) to finish covering the
demand at time i; the remaining demand at time i not covered by C must be covered
optimally by other contracts, as previously computed in OP[i, i, λ+ r].
For any OP[i, i, λ], we compute the optimal remaining cost when λ demand is
already covered. In order to obtain this value, we need to buy a new contract C(r, d)
which covers r units if demand of the M [i, j] − λ uncovered untis of demand. Here
any contract C(r, d) ∈ C should be considered. After the newly bought contract,
λ+ r demand has already been covered and the cost to cover the remaining M [i, j]−
(λ + r) has already been computed and stored in OP[i, i, λ + r]. Hence, summing up
OP[i, i, λ + r] and the cost pi(r, d) for the new contract C(r, d), we get the value for
OP[i, i, λ].
Now consider a subinterval [i, j] of length ` = j− i+ 1 ≥ 2, where 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ dk.
This interval is either split into two non-overlapping subintervals of smaller length
(Case I), or a long contract of length equal to or greater than ` that completely
covers [i, j] is bought, at a certain demand rate r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ M [i, j] (Case II).
Given Assumption A2 and A3, for any instances of contracts C
(y)
x and C
(q)
p , either
the duration of one contract is fully contained in the other, or the two contracts never
overlap in time: Hence, given that we consider all intervals [i, j], including the ones
that may correspond to actual instances of contracts, it is enough to consider only
these two cases.
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In Case I, we split the interval at time z such that the solution OP[i, z, λ] + OP[z+
1, j, λ] is minimized over all z between i and j (Line 9). Since the lengths of the two
subintervals z − i+ 1 and j − z are both smaller than `, OP[i, z, λ] and OP[z + 1, j, λ]
already store the cost of optimal solutions for these subproblems, respectively, by the
induction hypothesis. Hence OP[i, z, λ] + OP[z + 1, j, λ] will yield the optimal solution
for OP[i, j, λ] if Case I applies.
In Case II, we buy a long contract with rate r. First, we need to check which con-
tracts with longer durations can cover [i, j] fully, and store the candidate contracts
in C ′. A candidate contract C(x)(t(x), r, d), where t(x) = b · d according to Assump-
tion A3, satisfies t(x) ≤ i < j < t(x) + d). The algorithm picks the valid candidate
contract that minimizes pi(r, d) plus the optimal cost of covering the largest remaining
demand M [i, j]− (λ+ r) over [i, j], which has been previously computed and stored
in OP[i, j, λ+ r] (Line 10).
By choosing the smaller value of Cases I and II, we obtain the optimal cost for
subproblem [i, j, λ] (Line 12).
Time Complexity: Now we consider the time complexity of Off2D. The total
time complexity for the pre-computation part in Algorithm 4 is O(d2k). The first part
of Algorithm 5 in (Lines 2-4) takes O(dk ·k · σ̂) time, where σ̂ is the maximum demand
for the whole time interval. The first two loops of the second part (Lines 5-6) take
O(d2k) time and the for-loop in Line 8 takes O(σ̂) time. The statement in Line 9
requires O(dk) time and Lines 10 and 12 take time O(k) each. Therefore, the total
time complexity is O(d3k · σ̂) for a subinterval with length dk.
Thus, by summing up the computation time of d|σ|/dke subintervals of length dk,
where |σ| is the total duration of σ, we have an overall complexity of O(|σ| · d2k · σ̂).
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3.7 Higher Dimensions
Off2D and On2D are designed for the two-dimensional version of the PPP prob-
lem but they can also be extended towards a D-dimensional version of the problem,
where each additional dimension (other than the time duration dimension) would
indicate the rate at which you would buy a certain resource. Regarding Off2D we
need to do the following changes: For each additional dimension we need to extend
the dimension of the optimal cost matrix OP by one and add two additional loops in
Off2D’s Algorithm 5. Furthermore we only need to add one additional dimension
for the M matrix in Algorithm 4 which indicates the current demand dimension β,
M [i, j, β] and run the algorithm β times for the pre-computation.
Assume a scenario where a third dimension is added, e.g. computational and
network resources over time. The contracts C(r, r′, d) then cover r × r′ × d cuboids.
In order to adjust Algorithm 5, we add another loop after Line 3 which goes through
the maximum values λ′ of the additional demand (for λ′ = M [i, i, 2] − 1 to 0 do)
and change the statement in Line 4 to: OP[i, i, λ, λ′]← minC(r,r′,d)∈C′ OP[i, i, λ+ r, λ′+
r′] + pi(r, r′, d). The same loop must also be added after Line 8 and the updates of
the OP matrix must be changed accordingly in Lines 9 and 12.
The runtime of the pre-computation in Algorithm 4 would be increased by a factor
of D (i.e., by the dimension of the problem) and still be negligible regarding the overall
runtime (assuming D is a constant). For Algorithm 5 the runtime would increase by
a factor of Πi≥2σ̂i, where σi is the maximum demand for resource i, for i ≥ 1, leading
to an overall runtime of O(d3k · Πi≥1σ̂i) for each interval dk.
No changes are needed regarding On2D. It still mimics Off2D’s behavior and
given the Assumptions A2 and A3, the contract independence still holds for higher
dimensions. Hence, the proof for the competitive ratio of k still applies.
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The offline algorithm, for the D-dimensional problem is presented in Algorithms 6
and 7. As in two dimensions, the D-dimensional online algorithm can simply mimick
the D-dimensional offline algorithm. Given the resulting contract independencies, the
O(k)-competitiveness is maintained.
Algorithm 6 Pre-computation of matrix M
Input: Demand sequences σdimt , . . . , σ
dim
t+dk
(over interval [t, t + dk]) with dim ∈
{1, 2, ..., D − 1}.
Output: Matrix M .
1: for i = 1 to dk do
2: for dim = 1 to D − 1 do
3: M [i, i, dim]← σdimt+i
4: for i = 1 to dk − 1 do
5: for j = i+ 1 to dk do
6: for dim = 1 to D − 1 do
7: M [i, j, dim]← max{M [i, j − 1, dim], σdimt+j }
8: return M
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Algorithm 7 Offline Algorithm OffD-D
Input: Precomputed matrix M over interval [t, t+ dk, D].
Output: Optimal total costs OP[i, j, ·, ·, . . . , ·] for all intervals within [t, t+ dk].
1: Initialize all entries in OP to be 0 and dim = D − 1.
2: for i = 1 to dk do
3: for λ1 = M [i, i, 1]− 1 to 0 do
4: for λ2 = M [i, i, 2]− 1 to 0 do
5:
...
6: for λdim = M [i, i, dim]− 1 to 0 do
7: OP[i, i, λ1, λ2, . . . , λdim] ← minC(r1,r2,...,rdim,d)∈C OP[i, i, λ1 + r1, λ2 +
r2, . . . , λdim] + pi(r1, r2, . . . , rdim, d)
8: for ` = 2 to dk do
9: for i = 1 to dk − `+ 1 do
10: j = i+ `− 1
11: for λ1 = M [i, j, 1]− 1 to 0 do
12: for λ2 = M [i, j, 2]− 1 to 0 do
13:
...
14: for λdim = M [i, j, dim]− 1 to 0 do
15: OP[i, j, λ1, λ2, . . . , λdim] ← mini≤z<j{OP[i, z, λ1, λ2, . . . , λdim] + OP[z +
1, j, λ1, λ2, . . . , λdim]}
16: C ′ ← {C(x)(t(x), r1, r2, . . . , rdim, d) ∈ C : t(x) = b · d for some positive
integer b and t(x) ≤ i < j ≤ t(x) + d}.
17: if C ′ is not empty then
18: OP[i, j, λ1, λ2, . . . , λdim] ← min{OP[i, j, λ1, λ2, . . . , λdim];
minC(r1,r2,...,rdim,d)∈C′1 OP[i, j, λ1 + r1, λ2 + r2, . . . , λdim + rdim] +
pi(r1, r2, . . . , rdim, d)}
19: return OP[1, dk, 0, 0, . . . , 0]
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3.8 Simulation
We have conducted a small simulation study to complement our formal analy-
sis. In this simulation, we consider k different square contracts where each contract
Ci(ri, di) has rate and duration ri = di = 2
i−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The price pi of a con-
tract is a function of the rate-duration product ri · di, and we study a parameter x to
vary the discount. Concretely, we consider a scenario where a twice as large time-rate
product is by factor (1 + x) more expensive, i.e., pi(2 · d · r) = (1 + x) · pi(d · r); we set
pi(1) = 1.
To generate the demand σ, we use a randomized scheme: non-zero demand re-
quests arrive according to a Poisson distribution with parameter λ, i.e., the time
between non-zero σt is exponentially distributed. For each non-zero request, we sam-
ple a demand value uniformly at random from the interval [1, y].
In this experiment, each simulation run represents 1000 time steps, and is repeated
10 times.
Impact of the request model. We first study how the competitive ratio de-
pends on the demand arrival pattern. Figure 3.5a plots the competitive ratio ρ as a
function of the Poisson distribution parameter λ. The price model with x = 0.5 is
used, and there are k = 8 contract types. First, we observe that the competitive ratio
ρ is bounded by approx. 5, which is slightly lower than what we expect in the worst-
case (cf Theorem 4). Another observation is that the competitive ratio decreases as
λ increases. This can be explained by the fact that demand rates become sparser for
increasing λ, and hence less contracts will be bought. Meanwhile, when the demand
rates are sparse, the offline algorithm will have less chance to buy a larger contract.
Put differently, the online algorithm will pay relatively more compared to the offline
algorithm for small λ, as it purchases more small contracts.
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Figure 3.5: Simulation Results under Different Settings.
Impact of the price model. Different price models also affect the purchasing
behavior.Figure 3.5b shows the competitive ratio ρ for different values x. (For this
scenario, we set y = 128, k = 8 and λ = 2.) We see a tradeoff: for small x, until
x = 0.5, the competitive ratio increases and then begins to decrease again. The
general trend can be explained by the fact that for small x, it is worthwhile to buy
larger contracts earlier, and it is hence impossible to charge On2D much; for larger
x, also an offline solution cannot profit from buying a large contract.
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Impact of the number of contracts. Finally, Figure 3.5c shows the competitive
ratio as a function of the number of contracts k. (We fix x = 0.5, y = 128 and
λ = 2 in this simulation.) The competitive ratio first increases as k increases but
then stabilizes. This stabilization is due to the fact that when we have eight or more
contracts (k ≥ 8), the largest contract can cover the maximum rate. In the beginning,
the ratio increases since the offline algorithm buys larger and larger contracts, and
the online algorithm pays for many small contracts along the way.
3.9 Conclusion
This work has shown that at the heart of efficient cloud resource allocation lies
a fundamental algorithmic problem, and we introduced the PPP2 problem, a 2-
dimensional variant of the online Parking Permit Problem PPP. We presented a
deterministic online algorithm On2D that provably achieves a competitive ratio of
k, where k is the total number of available contracts; if we relax Assumption A3,
the competitive ratio of our algorithm is 2k. We also showed that On2D is almost
optimal in the sense that no deterministic online algorithm for PPP2 can achieve a
competitive ratio lower than k/3. Finally, we proved that the offline version of PPP2
can be solved in polynomial time.
We believe that our work opens interesting directions for future research.
1. Optimality: The obvious open question regards the gap between the upper
bound k and the lower bound k/3 derived in this work.
2. Interval assumption: Interestingly, while the interval model only comes at the
cost of a small constant approximation factor, it seems hard to remove the
restriction while keeping optimality. In fact, we conjecture that computing an
optimal offline solution may even be NP-hard in general.
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3. Randomized algorithms: It will be interesting to study whether the random-
ized algorithms known from the classic parking permit problem can also be
generalized to multiple dimensions.
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Chapter 4
HOW TO BUY DISCOUNT VOUCHERS WITH EXPIRATION DATES?
A COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
In our modern times where alternatives are plenty, companies constantly look
for new ways to differentiate themselves from competitors, offering a wide range of
complex discounts and vouchers. For example, many gyms today offer daily, weekly
and yearly passes, at different rates. Also other consumable good industries offer
discount vouchers which expire independently of whether they have been used up by
then or not. Companies such as Groupon even follow a business model which to a
large extent consists in offering various discount vouchers for other companies.
Whether it makes sense to buy a pass or discount voucher with expiration date
is a difficult decision problem, due to uncertainty: customers often do not know how
frequently and how long they will be interested in a certain consumable good or
service. In the worst-case, right after having bought a yearly pass or a large number
of vouchers, a customer may lose interest or time.
We, in this work, initiate the study of the discount voucher purchasing problem:
the problem of how to buy discount vouchers with expiration dates, in an online
fashion, i.e., without knowing the future. We assume a conservative worst-case per-
spective and consider Murphy’s Law: whether and when a customer can make use of
its vouchers is determined by an adversary.
We are in the realm of online algorithms and competitive analysis, and we are in-
terested in online voucher buying strategies which are competitive against an optimal
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offline algorithm: the overall amount of money spent by the online algorithm is not
much higher than the money spent by a clairvoyant optimal offline algorithm, which
knows the entire future demand ahead of time.
The problem shares many similarities with evergreen online optimization problems
such as the the Parking Permit Problem [31] and the Bahncard Problem [19], where
benefits expire with time, regardless of usage. We consider the following two problem
variants:
1. Once-Expired-Lose-Discount (OELD): The voucher loses its discount for
the unused face value after its expiration date. However, its value can still be
used to buy goods at their regular price.
2. Once-Expired-Lose-Everything (OELE): The voucher loses its entire value
after its expiration date.
Sometimes, companies even limit the time window in which vouchers can be
bought. We will refer to this variant by Limited Purchasing Window (LPW).
Our Contribution. We initiate the study of the online voucher purchase prob-
lem, from a competitive analysis perspective. We present deterministic online algo-
rithms to compute a 4-competitive solution for OELE—which is optimal due to the
multi-discount ski rental lower bound [47]—and an 8-competitive solution to OELD.
We also prove a lower bound on the LPW variant, showing that the problem is in-
herently hard. Additionally, we also consider offline versions of the problems, and
present a polynomial-time optimal offline algorithm for OELE and LPW, as well as
a 2-competitive solution for OELD.
Organization. The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 4.2,
we review related work. In Section 4.3, we introduce three variants of the discount
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voucher purchasing problem and formulate our model. In Section 4.4, we discuss on-
line algorithms and competitive analysis for each variant respectively. In Section 4.4.1,
we present a case study and provide the general analysis for OELE. In Section 4.4.2,
we discuss the competitive analysis for OELD using the same algorithm for OELE. In
Section 4.4.3, we provide a lower bound analysis for LPW. In Section 4.5, we present
algorithms for these three variants. We present a polynomial-time optimal offline
algorithm for OELE in Section 4.5.1, and prove it to be be 2-competitive solution to
OELD in Section 4.5.2 and an optimal solution to LPW in Section 4.5.3. Finally, we
conclude our work in Section 4.6.
4.2 Related Work
Our work is motivated by the practical discount voucher purchasing problem and
by the online purchasing manner, i.e., the future demands of customers are unknown
in advance. One frequently used assumption in many online models is that once the
resource has been purchased, it will never expire, such as ski-rental problems [11],
facility location problems [21], buy-at-bulk [35] and rent-or-buy [28] problems. Some
other online problems, such as the Parking Permit Problem [31] and the Bahncard
Problem [19], instead assume purchases have time durations which expire regardless
of whether the purchase is used or not. Our work works on the second model which
assumes that the resource will expire after certain duration.
This work focuses on an online resource purchasing problem in which discount
vouchers or groupons are considered as resource to be bought. This work is motivated
by a real discount voucher or groupon purchasing problem. Refer to [44] and [43]
respectively for general information. The topics which are close to our work are
ski-rental problem or parking permit problem. The ski rental problem proposed in
[27] is one of the most fundamental problems and the authors in [27] studied its
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online version in economical aspects. There have been quite many generalizations
to this problem. For example, the authors in [36] studied the situation in which the
purchasing price varies over time while the rental cost stays at a fixed price. Ali et
al. [3] introduced a variant of the problem by assuming the skier knows the first
(or second) moment of the distribution of the number of ski days in a season. They
showed that knowing this information leads to achieving the best worst-case expected
competitive ratio performance. Other classic generalizations of this problem include
the replacement problem of Chunlin et al. [15] and cloud resource management [41].
Recently, Meyerson [31] proposed the parking permit problem and Hiroshi et al.
extends the classic ski rental problem to multislope ski rental problem [26].
The paper closest to our work is the ski rental problem studied by Guiqing et
al. [47]. The authors proposed the ski-rental problem with multiple discount options
in which there are n options each with a rental duration respectively. They presented
a 4-competitive online algorithm for continuous request sequence scenarios and also
showed a matching lower bound for this problem. Our work considers a discount
voucher purchasing problem with expiration dates, in which the cost of a voucher is
computed based on the volume of the resource, i.e., the number of yoga visits when
the voucher is a yoga pass. In [47], the contract is computed based on the time
duration. The first variant OELE studied in this work is similar to the ski rental
problem except that vouchers will expire at expiration date. Therefore, OELE is
multi-discount ski rental problem in each discount window. However, we extend this
problem to another two variants (OELD and LPW) and show approximation analysis
for each respectively. Our algorithm can work for any request sequences, while the
requests are required to be continuous in [47], i.e., every day there must be a request.
In addition to online algorithms with competitive analysis, we also make an effort on
the offline algorithm.
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4.3 Model
We are given a range of k different discount vouchers of increasing value V =
(v1, v2, · · · , vk). For simplicity, we will use vi to denote both the voucher as well as
its value, i.e., the number of consumable goods it represents. The price of the voucher
vi is denoted by Π(vi), and the price per unit consumable is denoted by pi(vi), i.e.,
pi(vi) = Π(vi)/vi. Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), we assume that pi(vj) ≤ pi(vi)
for j > i: more expensive, smaller vouchers are never interesting and can be ignored.
We will denote by v0 the “voucher” which represents a single unit, without discount;
its price is denoted by pi(v0) = Π(v0).
Each discount voucher has an expiration date, which is independent of the con-
sumption of the good. After expiring, a voucher vi may either lose its entire value
Π(vi), or it may fall back to its so-called face value: in this case, it can only be used
to buy bΠ(vi)/Π(v0)c ≤ vi many goods. We will refer to the first variant by Once-
Expire-Lose-Everything (OELE), and to the second variant by Once-Expire-
Lose-Discount (OELD). Sometimes, we will also restrict the time window in which
new vouchers can be bought: we will refer to this variant by Limited Purchasing
Window (LPW).
We model the demand for a given consumable good over time using a binary
consumption request sequence σ = (σ1, σ2, . . .): the entry σt = 1 denotes that the
good is consumed at time t, and σt = 0 denotes that the good is not consumed. If
clear from the context, we will sometimes refer by σt to the time t of the request. All
algorithms and results in our work can easily be extended if the demand for a good
is non-binary. The sequence σ is revealed over time to the online algorithm: at time
t, the online algorithm only knows the first t− 1 entries, henceforth denoted by σ<t.
Whenever a consumption request occurs (σt = 1), the online algorithm either has to
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OELD 
LPW 
OELE 
purchasing 
window 
expiration 
date (   ) 
purchasing/discount window 
time 
remaining face value = 0 
remaining face value = $20 
(equivalent to 1 single visit) 
remaining face value = 0 
e
p
2 requests 
Example for model 
Figure 4.1: Example for OELE, OELD and LPW Given a Voucher v1 = 4 with
Π(v1) = 40 and a Single-unit Option v0 with Price Π(v0) = 20. When v1 Is Bought
within the Purchasing Window, the Remaining Face Value after the Voucher Expires
Is Shown for Each Variant.
have a voucher ready or buy a new one (possibly v0). The offline algorithm always
knows the entire sequence σ.
Example. Figure 4.1 gives an example to describe our model in details. Consider
a yoga voucher v1 for 4 entries costs 40 dollars, i.e., v1 = 4 and Π(v1) = 40, while
a single entry v0 without discounts costs 20 dollars (Π(v0) = 20). If Alice buys the
voucher v1 at her first visit, and ends up going only to two classes before the voucher
expires, she will not have won anything in the OELE model compared to a scenario
where she buys two v0 single vouchers. However, in the OELD model, there will be 20
dollars face value left after the expiration date, which is worth one additional single
visit. In the LPW model, there also exists the constraint that the purchasing time
window is limited (marked as dark grey in the figure). Alice either purchases the
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vouchers within this purchasing window, or she is forced to buy single entries (i.e.,
v0’s). 
Throughout this work, we will make the practically motivated assumption that
vouchers are issued for disjoint time intervals, and start at purchase time p and expire
at time e. That is, using the notation pi and ei for voucher vi, we have for any two
vouchers vj and v` we assume pj ≤ ej < p` ≤ e` or p` ≤ e` < pj ≤ ej.
Let Alg be an algorithm and let ΠAlg(σ) denote the overall cost that Alg incurs
on a request sequence σ. Moreover, let ΠAlg(σ≤t) denote the cost of Alg from the
beginning of σ through time t.
Our goal is to find an online algorithm On whose cost is not much larger than
the cost of an optimal offline algorithm Off. Concretely, we seek to minimize the
(worst-case) competitive ratio ρ over all σ: ρ = maxσ(ΠOn(σ)/ΠOff(σ)) + c, where c
is some additive constant.
4.4 Competitive Online Algorithm
This section first studies the OELE and OELD problem variants and presents
competitive online algorithms in turn, together with an analysis. Subsequently, we
prove that LPW is inherently hard to solve in an online setting.
4.4.1 Once-Expired-Lose-Everything (OELE)
The OELE problem variant can be seen as a generalization of classic ski rental:
the ski rental problem can be modeled using two contracts v0 and v1, where v1 has an
infinite duration and does not expire: the skis are bought. It is also a generalization
of multi-discount ski rental [47] as in each discount window each voucher in OELE
can be seen as a contract in multi-discount ski rental problem. The volume of the
voucher can be seen as the duration of the contract. The expiration date can be set
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as the date for the last request. After the vouchers are expired and the next discount
window starts, we apply a new generalization of multi-discount ski rental problem.
Therefore, our problem is volume based in which each voucher has an expiration date
while multi-discount ski rental problem is time based. This variant is provided as a
building block for the other variants, OELD and LPW, for both online and offline
versions.
The Algorithm
In order to solve this problem, we propose the following algorithm On, see Algorith-
m 8. For ease of explanation, assume dummy vouchers v−1 and vk+1 with Π(v−1) = 0
and Π(vk+1) =∞. On pursues an amortization strategy: it always seeks to buy the
largest voucher whose cost is less than or equal to the accumulated cost within the
current discount window.
On maintains two values: C to store the total accumulated cost and C ′ to indicate
the cost incurred within each discount window. We denote by τ1, τ2, · · · the time
point at which On decides to buy a new voucher, i.e., τi indicates the time for the
first request covered by the ith voucher. We use j as an index to indicate the current
request (i.e., the jth request occurs at time σj), and i to indicate the index of the
current voucher that On is going to buy. τs indicates the starting point of the requests
for sth voucher bought by our online algorithm, where s is an index starting from 1.
Initially, C is set to be 0, while j and s are both set to be 1 (Line 1). In the beginning
of each discount window, C ′ is initially set to be 0 and i is set to be 1 (Line 3).
Therefore, we can get the starting point τs of each bought voucher which is denoted
by σj (Line 4). Then we can update the current discount window. For example, if
the expiration date is t, the last request is σe where σe ≤ t and σe is the largest time
which is less than or equal to t. Hence, the current discount window spans from σj to
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Algorithm 8 Online algorithm On
Input: online request sequence σ = (σ1, σ2, . . .)
Output: overall cost
1: C ← 0, j ← 1, s← 1
2: while new ∃ request σj do
3: C ′ ← 0, i← 0
4: τs ← σj
5: update discount window
6: for each new request at σj coming within the current discount window do
7: if request at σj is not yet covered by a voucher then
8: buy voucher vi
9: update i s.t. Π(vi) ≤ C ′ < Π(vi+1)
10: C ′ ← C ′ + Π(vi)
11: j ← j + 1
12: s← s+ 1
13: C ← C + C ′
14: return C
σe. After the initialization of the data structures, On computes the cost C
′ for each
discount window separately (Lines 6-Line 11). If the current request σj is not covered
by a voucher, buy voucher vi and update index i such that Π(vi) ≤ C < Π(vi+1)
(Lines 8-Line 9). In other words, On buys the largest voucher whose cost is less than
or equal to the accumulated cost within the current discount window. Update the
cost C ′ by adding voucher cost Π(vi) into it (Line 10). Increment request index j by
1 (Line 11). After finishing dealing with all the requests within the current discount
window, increment index s by 1 (Line 12) and add the cost C ′ obtained within the
current discount window to the total cost C (Line 13).
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Case Study
In order to illustrate the behavior and the performance of On within a discount
window in some specific scenarios, we consider the following study cases: let the
vouchers and discount be the way such that there will always exist such voucher vi
satisfying f(vi) = 2
i−1 for integer i where 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume that v1 = v0 is a single
visit.
Now let us take a look at how On behaves in the following two study cases.
Case 1 : We assume that the request sequence T is not sufficient enough for On
such that On cannot buy multiple vk’s and the largest voucher On purchase is vx,
where 1 ≤ x ≤ k. It is trivial to see that initially On will purchase v1 with cost 1
and another v1 for the second request. After that, On will turn to buy each voucher
from v2 to vi once sequentially. Hence, we have:
Π(On) = Π(v1) + Π(v1) + Π(v2) + · · ·+ Π(vx)
= 1 + 1 + 2 + · · ·+ 2x−1
= 1 +
x−1∑
i=0
2i
= 2x = 4 · 2x−2
Let the total number of requests be V . Note that except for the last voucher, the
length of the voucher is the number of the requests within this voucher. Therefore,
we can obtain V by summing up all the vouchers before vx and the real data requests
within the last voucher vx. In the following, we use Π
−1(c) to denote the length of
the voucher whose cost is equal to c.
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V ol > Π−1(1) + Π−1(1) + Π−1(2) + · · ·+ Π−1(2x−2)
= Π−1(1) +
k−2∑
i=0
Π−1(2i)
> Π−1(2x−2)
Therefore, we have Π(Off) ≥ Π(V ol) > Π(f−1(2k−2)) = 2x−2 and hence ρ =
Π(On)
Π(Off)
< 4.
Case 2: In this case we assume that On buys multiple vouchers vk, i.e., On buys
α vouchers vk where α ≥ 2. Similarly On will buy 2 vouchers v1 and then turn to
buy each voucher from v2 to vk−1 once sequently. Finally On keeps purchasing the
same voucher vk for α times. We can compute the cost of the online algorithm and
offline algorithm similarly:
Π(ON) = pi(v1) + pi(v1) + pi(v2) + · · ·+ α · pi(vk)
= 1 + 1 + 2 + · · ·+ α · 2k−1
= 1 +
k−1∑
i=0
2i + (α− 1)2k−1
=
α + 1
2
2k = (α + 1) · 2k−1
Now we compute the total requests V ol:
V ol > pi−1(1) + pi−1(1) + pi−1(2) + · · ·+ pi−1(2k−2) + (α− 1)pi−1(2k−1)
= pi−1(1) +
k−2∑
i=0
pi−1(2i) + (α− 1)pi−1(2k−2)
> (α− 1)pi−1(2k−1)
It is trivial to see that within a discount window the cost of the offline algorithm
should be at least equal to the total cost of α − 1 vouchers vk, i.e., Π(Off) ≥
(α − 1)2k−1. Therefore, ρ = Π(On)
Π(Off)
< (α+1)·2
k−1
(α−1)·2k−1 ≤ 2. Since the behavior of On for
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each discount window is independent for OELE, we can derive the competitive ratio
for the whole request sequence σ is 4.
General Analysis
Note that τ1, τ2, · · · are the starting points of the vouchers at which On decides to
buy a new voucher. To discuss the competitive analysis of our algorithm, let τ0 be 0,
which indicates that there is no voucher bought yet. Let the ith voucher bought be
v′i.
Now we prove that the competitive ratio ρ = Πτ (On)/Πτ (Off) ≤ 4 for all τ ’s
within each discount window, where τ ∈ (τ1, τ2, · · · ) is the starting point of vouchers
bought by On. Lemma 5 proves the competitive ratio for the requests within the first
discount window. It is obvious to show the ratio for the requests within other discount
windows by rebuilding the index i of starting point τi. For example, if the starting
point sequence for a discount window starts at τx, we just need to set τj = τx+j−1,
where j ≥ 1. We discuss the ratio between the cost of On before it decides to buy
a new voucher Πτm−1(On) (note that between vouchers, On will not buy any other
vouchers) and the cost of Off after On decides to buy this new voucher is Πτm(Off).
Lemma 5. The cost of On before it decides to buy a new voucher at τm is at most
twice the cost of Off after On decides to buy this new voucher for request τm, i.e.,
Πτm−1(On)/Πτm(Off) ≤ 2 within each discount window, where m ≥ 1.
Proof. We argue by induction on m1. Note that τ0 = 0.
Base case (m = 1 and m = 2): When m = 1, according to our algorithm On,
Πτ0(On) = 0. Since there is a request at time τ1 and the offline algorithm will buy
1This work was developed concurrently and independently to [47]; however this proof shows many
similarities to the one in [47].
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a voucher v0, we have Πτ1(Off) = Π(v0). Therefore, we have Πτ0(On)/Πτ1(Off) =
0 ≤ 2. Now consider the case m = 2. Since at time τ1, On has already bought a
voucher v0, Πτ1(On) = Π(v0). For Off it either buys two vouchers v0 with cost
of 2Π(v0) or buy a voucher vj with cost Π(v0) < Π(vj) ≤ 2Π(v0). Hence, we have
Πτ1(On)/Πτ2(Off) ≤ 2.
Induction case (m ≥ 2): According to the induction hypothesis, we assume that
Πτm−2(On)/Πτm−1(Off) ≤ 2 and Πτm−1(On)/Πτm(Off) ≤ 2 and we intend to show
Πτm(On)/Πτm+1(Off) ≤ 2. By our algorithm, Π(v′m−1) ≤ Πτm−2(On) and Π(v′m) ≤
Πτm−1(On). Note that no voucher satisfies Π(vi) ∈ (Π(v′m−1),Πτm−2(On)] or Π(vi) ∈
(Π(v′m),Πτm−1(On)] according to the algorithm structure.
Now consider the vouchers that Off buys to cover the interval [τ1, τm+2). Assume
that Off purchases a sequence of vouchers v∗1, v
∗
2, · · · , v∗l . W.l.o.g., we assume
v∗1 ≤ v∗2, · · · ,≤ v∗l . We have Πτm+1(Off) = Π(v∗1) + · · · + Π(v∗l ). Now we consider
the following three cases on the cost of the largest voucher v∗l Off buys:
1. Π(v∗l ) ≥ Πτm−1(On). We have Πτm+1(Off) ≥ Π(v∗l ) ≥ Πτm−1(On). Since
Πτm(On) = Πτm−1(On)+Π(v
′
m) ≤ 2Πτm−1(On), we have Πτm(On) /Πτm+1(Off)
≤ 2.
2. Πτm−2(On) ≤ Π(v∗l ) < Πτm−1(On). In this case, recall that Π(v∗l ) /∈ (Π(v′m),
Πτm−1(On)] and Π(v
∗
l ) ≤ Π(v′m). The example is shown in Figure 4.2a. Since
Π(v∗l ) ≤ Π(v′m), the requests with green are covered by vouchers v∗α, · · · , v∗l−1
where 1 ≤ α ≤ l − 1. Therefore, Π(v∗1) + · · · + Π(v∗l−1) ≥ Πτm(Off). Note
that v∗l is fully used. Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, Πτm(Off) ≥
Πτm−1(On)/2. Hence, we have Π(v
∗
1)+· · ·+Π(v∗l−1) ≥ Πτm(Off) ≥ Πτm−1(On)/2.
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(a) In the Case when Πτm−2(On) ≤ Π(v∗l ) < Πτm−1(On), We Have
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Figure 4.2: Example to Show Proof for Lemma 5.
Now we can compute Πτm+1(Off) as following:
Πτm+1(Off) = Π(v
∗
1) + · · ·+ Π(v∗l ) (4.1)
≥ Πτm−1(On)/2 + Π(v∗l ) (4.2)
≥ (Πτm−2(On) + Π(v′m−1))/2 + Πτm−2(On) (4.3)
≥ Π(v′m−1) + Πτm−2(On) (4.4)
Equality (4.1) holds by the definition and Inequality (4.2) is obtained by the in-
duction hypothesis as discussed before. We substitute Πτm−1(On) with Πτm−2(On)
+Π(v′m−1) by algorithm structure and derive Inequality (4.3). In Inequali-
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ty (4.4), according to the algorithm structure of On, we have Πτm−2(On) ≥
Π(v′m−1).
Note that Πτm(On) = Πτm−1(On) + Π(v
′
m) ≤ 2Πτm−1(On) = 2(Πτm−2(On) +
Π(v′m−1)). Hence, we have Πτm(On)/Πτm+1(Off) ≤ 2.
3. Π(v∗l ) < Πτm−2(On). Recall that Π(v
∗
l ) /∈ (Π(v′m−1),Πτm−2(On)], hence Π(v∗l ) ≤
Π(v′m−1) and v
∗
l ≤ v′m−1. Note that v∗l is the largest voucher among those Off
buys. Now consider the interval [τm, τm+1]. Since no voucher v
∗
1, v
∗
2, · · · , v∗l
can cover the requests that start before τm−1 and end after τm (otherwise it
violates Π(v∗l ) ≤ Π(v′m−1)), there exists a y such that the last time voucher v∗y
is used is within the interval [τm−1, τm], where 1 ≤ y < l showed in Figure 4.2b.
By the induction hypothesis, we have Π(v∗1) + · · ·+ Π(v∗y) ≥ Πτm−2(On)/2. On
the other hand, the interval that the vouchers v∗y+1 to v
∗
l cover is no less than
the interval [τm, τm+1], therefore, we have Π(v
∗
y+1) + · · · + Π(v∗l ) ≥ Π(v′m) and
Πτm+1(Off) ≥ Πτm−2(On)/2+Π(v′m). Hence Πτm(On) = Πτm−1(On)+Π(v′m) =
Πτm−2(On) + Π(v
′
m−1) + Π(v
′
m) ≤ Πτm−2(On) + 2Π(v′m).
Therefore, it holds for all the cases that Πτm(On)/Πτm+1(Off) ≤ 2.
Theorem 8. Algorithm On is 4-competitive.
Proof. According to Lemma 5, within each discount window we have:
ρ ≤ max
m
Πτm(On)/Πτm(Off) = (Πτm−1(On) + Π(v
′
m))/Πτm(Off)
≤ 2Πτm−1(On)/Πτm(Off) ≤ 4.
We have already shown above that the competitive ratio within each discount window
is bounded by 4. Since it is independent among all the discount windows, we can
know that Algorithm On is 4-competitive.
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4.4.2 Once-Expired-Lose-Discount (OELD)
In contrast to the OELE model, the OELD model allows to keep the face value of
the voucher, to buy goods at a price without discounts. In order to solve the OELD
problem, we only slightly modify the algorithm On: our proposed algorithm OELD
is essentially On, with the obvious improvement that new vouchers are only bought
once remaining face values are used up.
Note that after a voucher expires, we lose discount for the remaining unused value.
For example (Figure 4.3), a voucher v for 6 days yoga visit costs 60 dollars and it
is valid before an expiration date, i.e., May 1st 2015, while a single yoga visit costs
20 dollars. After May 1st when the voucher expires, 4 visits have been used and the
remaining value for the unused 2 visits becomes 20 dollars, which equals to 1 single
visits, instead of 2 visits. That is, the remaining value is the real cost in proportional
to the unused visits. As shown in Figure 4.3, when there is one future request coming
in the second discount window, OELD can take advantage of the remaining face value
to cover the new coming request while OELE has to buy a new single visit instead.
OELD 
OELE 
Example for 2-factor 
4 requests covered by v 
($60) with 2 unused visits a single visit ($20) is bought 
covered by remaining face 
value ($20) which is 
equivalent to 1 single visit 
4 requests covered by v 
($60) with 2 unused visits 
Figure 4.3: Example to Show that the Optimal Solution for OELD Is at least Half of
That for OELE Given a Voucher v = 6 with Π(v) = 60 and Π(v0) = 20.
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Theorem 9. Algorithm On is 8-competitive.
Proof. We first prove the following helper lemma: it shows that by introducing re-
maining face value without discount in OELD, the optimal solution to OELE is not
far away from that to OELD.
Lemma 6. Let Off1 be the optimal solution to our voucher purchasing problem
under OELD model. And let Off2 be the optimal solution for OELE. By introducing
remaining face value without discount, Off1 is a constant factor away from Off2,
i.e., Π(Off2) ≤ maxi(2− vi−1vi )Π(Off1).
Proof. Let Off1 be the optimal solution for OELD. W.l.o.g, Off1 starts to use a
voucher until it is fully used, then turns to buy next one. Thus all the other vouchers
are fully consumed except for the last voucher within each discount window. Such
optimal solution exists since if there is a voucher v in Off1 which is fully unused
within the current discount window, we can buy single visits instead with the same
cost to cover those requests in future discount windows covered by the remaining
value from v.
First let us construct an intermediate solution Off′ as following: for each request
covered by the remaining value in Off1, replace it with a newly bought single visit.
As discussed in our example above, the newly bought single visits add extra cost
into Off′, while the same amount of cost has already been paid by purchasing large
voucher with some unused visits after the expiration date. We claim that for any
voucher vi in Off1 with unused remaining value where i > 1, the used number of
visits must be no less than vi−1. Otherwise, Off1 can buy vi−1 and single visits for
the requests covered by vi instead with less cost, which violates the optimality of
Off1. Therefore, the minimum used value is
vi−1
vi
Π(vi), and the maximum remaining
value without discount can be computed by (1 − vi−1
vi
) · Π(vi). This guarantees that
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for each such vi, the cost Off
′ pays is the summation of the cost for vi (Π(vi)) and
the cost for the newly bought single visits (at most (1 − vi−1
vi
) · Π(vi)), that is Off′
pays at most (1 − vi−1
vi
) · Π(vi) + Π(vi) = (2 − vi−1vi ) · Π(vi). Note that 0 <
vi−1
vi
< 1.
Summing up the cost for all vouchers, we have Π(Off′) ≤ maxi(2− vi−1vi )Π(Off1).
Now consider the optimal solution Off2 for OELE. It is obvious to see that in
Off′, the remaining value is not reused. Given the optimality of Off, we can obtain
that Π(Off2) ≤ Π(Off′). Therefore, we have Π(Off2) ≤ Π(Off′) ≤ maxi(2 −
vi−1
vi
)Π(Off1).
Now consider applying the online algorithm OELD shown in Algorithm 8 to the
OELD model. OELD can be seen as an online algorithm for OELD which does
not use the remaining face value. Theorem 9 shows that OELD is an 8-competitive
online algorithm for OELD.
According to Theorem 8, On is 4-competitive for OELE. Moreover, Lemma 6
indicates that in the worst case the optimal solution for OELD costs at least half of
that for OELE. Hence we have: ρ = Π(On)/Π(Off1) ≤ 2Π(On)/Π(Off) ≤ 8.
4.4.3 Limited Purchasing Window (LPW)
Note that the major difference between OELD and LPW lies on the length of the
purchasing window. In OELD model, the purchasing window is same as the discount
window, therefore, customers can buy vouchers anytime before the expiration date.
However, in LPW model, the purchasing window is limited and customers need to
decide to buy which vouchers and how many of them without knowing information
about future requests. For any online algorithm, there must be a certain request
sequence such that for any large vouchers bought within the purchasing window,
there will be no more future requests to consume them within the same discount
window. Therefore, for those vouchers, all the visits will lose discount and be treated
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as single visits. That is, for an online algorithm which buys single visits for all the
requests will give us a competitive ratio at the discount factor. Theorem 10 formally
describes this observation.
Theorem 10. The lower bound for any algorithm equals the discount factor.
Proof. Assume that there is a smart adversary and the adversary follows two basic
principles: 1. The adversary will never schedule demand within a purchasing window
and 2. The adversary never schedules demand whenever the algorithm has a valid
voucher for an discount window. If the algorithm buys a voucher within a discount
window, the adversary will not schedule any demand, causing the voucher to be left
unused within the period and therefore losing its discount factor. If the algorithm
buys no voucher within the purchasing window, the adversary schedules demand for
the rest of the discount window which can only be served by vouchers with no discount
(either remaining or newly bought). Off on the other hand will buy a voucher for
this discount window to cover the demand after the purchasing window, which leads
to a lower bound equal to the discount factor.
4.5 Optimal Offline Algorithm
In this section, we present an efficient algorithm to solve the offline version of
discount voucher purchase problem. We show that the solution could be computed
by a dynamic programming algorithm in polynomial time. We prove the optimality
of the algorithm for OELE and LPW separately and show the algorithm is a 2-
approximation solution for OELD.
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4.5.1 Once-Expired-Lose-Everything (OELE)
We present an optimal solution for this variant, shown in Algorithm 9, which is a
dynamic programming based algorithm with a polynomial time complexity. In order
to analyze the time complexity of the offline algorithm, we assume that there are n
requests in σ, i.e., σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}.
The basic idea behind the offline algorithm is that the optimal cost for any number
of requests within the same discount window is obtained by the summation of the costs
of two parts: one for buying a voucher to cover a certain amount of requests while the
other one is the cost to cover the previous amount of request. Note that the optimal
solutions to this smaller number of requests have already been computed. Since the
purchasing behavior for each discount window is independent, we can compute the
optimal solution for each discount window respectively.
First, let us discuss the data structure used in Algorithm 9. We recompute the
request sequence and store the number of requests within each discount window in an
array R. Assume that there are m such discount windows. Therefore, R[s] represents
the number of requests within the sth discount window, where 1 ≤ s ≤ m. We store
the optimal solution for the sth discount window in an array Cs of size R[s] + 1, in
which the entry Cs[i] indicates the optimal solution to the requests from the beginning
to time σi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Initially, Cs[0] is set to 0 and Cs[i] is set to infinity for
i ∈ [1, R[s]]. The summation of optimal solutions for all discount windows yields the
optimal solution, which is denoted as C in the algorithm.
The algorithm proceeds as follows: It computes the optimal solution for the num-
ber of requests n′ starting from 1. When the number of requests is x, where x > 1, the
optimal solution can be computed by picking such a voucher g that the summation
of the voucher cost Π(g) and the cost for the uncovered requests by g (denoted as
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Cs[x− g] for certain s) is minimum. Note that Cs[x− g] has already been computed
optimally, this summation will yield the optimal solution for n′ = x.
Algorithm 9 Offline Algorithm Off
Input: Request sequence σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}.
Output: Total Cost.
1: Let R[1], · · · , R[m] be the number of requests within each discount window and
m be the number of discount windows
2: C ← 0
3: for s = 1 to m do
4: Cr[0]← 0
5: for i = 1 to R[s] do
6: Cs[i]←∞
7: for i = 1 to R[s] do
8: for j = 1 to k do
9: l← max{0, i− vj}
10: Cs[i]← min{Cs[i], Cs[l] + Π(vj)}
11: C ← C + Cs[R[s]]
12: return C
Theorem 11 shows the optimality and the time complexity of this algorithm.
Theorem 11. Algorithm Off computes an optimal offline solution to OELE in
O(nk) time.
Proof. Correctness: Due to the independency among discount windows, we just
need to prove the correctness for each discount window. Given a request sequence in
the sth discount window, we prove the correctness of our algorithm by induction on
i, the number of the requests. In the base case of i = 1, it is trivial to see that the
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minimum cost to cover a request is the cost of the minimum voucher, i.e., Π(v0). In
Line 9, l will be 0 since the length of any voucher is at least 1. Hence, since initially
Cr[1] is infinity, Cs[0] + Π(v0)(= Π(v0)) will give the optimal solution for the first
request in Line 10.
Now we consider the inductive case when i ≥ 2. The optimal solution is obtained
by buying a voucher, say vj, which minimizes the total cost of the newly bought
voucher vj and the optimal cost to cover the other i − vj requests. Since the new
voucher will cover vj requests, there are l = max{i − vj, 0} requests uncovered by
vj. According to the induction hypothesis, C[l] stores the optimal solution to cover
l = max{i−vj, 0} requests since l ≤ i. Therefore, the minimum value of Cs[l]+Π(vj)
over all j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, computes the optimal cost of covering i requests. We
then know that Cs[R[s]] is an optimal solution to our problem in the current discount
window. Hence, the summation of Cs[R[s]] for all s ∈ [1,m] will give the optimal
solution (Line 11).
Time complexity: Now let us consider the time complexity of our algorithm. The
precomputation in Line 1 takes O(n) time. For the sth discount window, the initial-
ization part of our algorithm (Lines 4-6) takes O(R[s]) times. The two for-loops in
Lines 7 and 8 take O(R[s]k) time. Since there will be m discount windows (Line 3),
the total time is n +
∑m
s=1R[s]k = n + nk. Therefore, the total time complexity is
O(nk).
4.5.2 Once-Expired-Lose-Discount (OELD)
Note that in Theorem 6 we have already shown that the optimal solution to OELE
is not far away from that to OELD, i.e., the optimal solution to OELE is at most
twice of that to OELD. In Theorem 12, we show that optimal solution On to OELE
shown in Algorithm 9 gives a 2-approximation solution to OELD.
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Theorem 12. Algorithm 9 gives a 2-approximation solution to OELD in time O(nk).
Proof. Theorem 11 has already shown the optimality of Algorithm 9 for OELE. Ac-
cording to Lemma 6, in the worst case the optimal solution to OELD is at least half
of that to OELE. Therefore Algorithm Off gives a 2-approximation algorithm for
our problem in time O(nk).
4.5.3 Limited Purchasing Window (LPW)
For the offline algorithm, the request sequence is given in advance hence the
behavior of the offline algorithm is the same as that of OELE. Theorem 13 proves the
optimality of Off for LPW.
Theorem 13. Algorithm 9 computes an optimal solution to our problem in time
O(nk).
Proof. Since all the requests are known in advance for the offline algorithm, the deci-
sion to buy vouchers is not limited by the purchasing window any more. This variant
shares the same offline algorithm as OELE. Therefore, Algorithm 9 also computes an
optimal solution to LPW in O(nk) time.
4.6 Conclusion
This work studied the Discount Voucher Purchasing Problem and three variants
of this problem:
OELE: Vouchers lose their entire value after expiration;
OELD: Vouchers lose their discount value after expiration;
LPW: Vouchers can only be bought during a certain time window.
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We have presented an online algorithm On that can compute a 4-competitive solution
to OELE and an 8-competitive solution to OELD. We have also proven a lower bound
on online competitive ratio for LPW. In addition, we have presented an offline algo-
rithm that can compute an optimal solution to OELE and LPW and a 2-competitive
solution to OELD.
We propose the following three interesting research topics:
1. Online algorithms: Currently, the remaining value in OELD is not used. One
possible future topic is to design an online algorithm which takes use of the
remaining value.
2. Computational complexity: We have presented a 2-competitive optimal algo-
rithm for OELD. It would be useful to have theoretical computational complex-
ity analysis for this variant.
3. In this work, we have not evaluated the performance of our algorithm in sim-
ulation. In order to have some knowledge of the performance, we propose to
evaluate the following metrics which can show the properties of our algorithms:
• Different discount functions: Different discount functions affect the pur-
chasing pattern of the online algorithm. We propose to evaluate the com-
petitive ratio under different discount functions and compare the contracts
purchased along the proceeding to the largest one for the online algorithm.
• Different voucher sets: The behavior (e.g., competitive ratios) of the online
algorithm under different voucher sets is an interesting research topic to
explore.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we have studied three critical problems in resource allocation.
In the first problem, we have discussed a scenario where a service can be seamlessly
migrated closer to users for better quality of service. We have studied the strategies of
when and where to migrate the service, and also how much resource to purchase while
migrating the service. We have presented optimal migration contracts purchasing
strategies under two different pricing models: Pay-as-You-Come and Pay-as-You-
Go. We have also discussed two online algorithms and validated their quantified
competitive results via simulation.
For future work, we propose the following two possible research directions for the
first work:
1. Online algorithms: One interesting research task is to discuss the competitive
online algorithm for our first problem.
2. Experiments: Currently, we propose two online algorithms and evaluate their
competitive ratios with experiments. However, the settings used in the eval-
uation have some constraints. Therefore, another possible future work could
be to investigate the competitive ratio under different simulation settings, i.e.,
different request models.
In the second problem, we have studied a cost-effective cloud resource allocation
problem and introduced the 2-dimensional Parking Permit Problem PPP2. We have
showed that our problem can be seen as equivalent to the PPP2 problem and we
have presented an online algorithm with competitive analysis on its upper bound and
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lower bound. We have also proposed an offline algorithm which the online algorithm
relies on as a black box. At the end of this work, we have extended the 2-dimension
problem to higher dimensions, introducing the D-dimension PPP problem, and have
proposed an optimal algorithm.
We propose the following two interesting research topics:
1. Randomized algorithms: It would be interesting to investigate whether the
randomized algorithms known for the classic parking permit problem can also
be generalized to two or even higher dimensions.
2. Experiments: We have already evaluated the performance of our algorithms
under the request model in which the rate the of the requests follows a uniform
distribution. An interesting research direction is to evaluate the performance for
other different distributions (e.g., normal distribution) and analyze how these
request models affect the competitive ratios. Since different discount functions
may affect the competitive results, it would be useful to simulate under different
discount functions, such as logarithmic or square discount.
In the third problem, we have introduced the Discount Voucher Purchasing Prob-
lem and three variants of this problem:
OELE: Vouchers lose their entire value after expiration;
OELD: Vouchers lose their discount value after expiration;
LPW: Vouchers can only be bought during a certain time window.
We have presented an online algorithm On that can compute a 4-competitive solution
to OELE and an 8-competitive solution to OELD. We have also proven a lower bound
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on online competitive ratio for LPW. In addition, we have presented an offline algo-
rithm that can compute an optimal solution to OELE and LPW and a 2-competitive
solution to OELD.
We propose the following three interesting research topics:
1. Online algorithms: Currently, the remaining value (the value after expiration
date and without discount) in OELD is not used. One possible future topic is
to design an online algorithm which takes use of the remaining value.
2. Computational complexity: We have presented a 2-competitive optimal algo-
rithm for OELD. However, we have not discussed the hardness to find an opti-
mal solution. It would be useful to have theoretical computational complexity
analysis for this variant.
3. In this work, we have not evaluated the performance of our algorithm in sim-
ulation. In order to have some knowledge of the performance, we propose to
evaluate the following metrics which can show the properties of our algorithms:
• Different discount functions: Different discount functions affect the pur-
chasing pattern of the online algorithm. We propose to evaluate the com-
petitive ratio under different discount functions and compare the contracts
purchased along the proceeding to the largest one for the online algorithm.
• Different voucher sets: The behavior (e.g., competitive ratios) of the online
algorithm under different voucher sets is an interesting research topic to
explore.
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